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ABSTRACT
Information security management aims at ensuring proper protection of information values and in-
formation processing systems (i.e. assets). Information security risk management techniques are
incorporated to deal with threats and vulnerabilities that impose risks to information security proper-
ties of these assets. This paper investigates the current state of risk management practices being used
in information security management in the DACH region (Germany, Austria, Switzerland). We used
an anonymous online survey targeting strategic and operative information security and risk managers
and collected data from 26 organizations. We analyzed general practices, documentation artifacts, pat-
terns of stakeholder collaboration as well as tool types and data sources used by enterprises to conduct
information security management activities. Our findings show that the state of practice of informa-
tion security risk management is in need of improvement. Current industrial practice heavily relies
on manual data collection and complex potentially subjective decision processes with multiple stake-
holders involved. Dedicated risk management tools and methods are used selectively and neglected
in favor of general-purpose documentation tools and direct communication between stakeholders. In
light of our results we propose guidelines for the development of risk management practices that are
better aligned with the current operational situation in information security management.
1. Introduction
Information security is concerned with the protection of
information regarding confidentiality, integrity and availabil-
ity. With the advent of tighter regulatory demands regarding
information security (such as the EU GDPR and NIS Di-
rective) and increasing customer demands, enterprises are
forced to establish measures to ensure the information secu-
rity of their valuable assets. This especially applies to en-
terprises working with protected Personal Identifiable Infor-
mation (PII), payment data or other sensitive information.
Establishing and operating an Information Security Man-
agement System (ISMS) has become the tool of choice to
systematically deal with information security risks. ISMSs
provide actionable sets of requirements, policies, guidelines
and process definitions to aid organizations in their quest to
comply with their individual information security goals. In-
formation Security Risk Management (ISRM) is a vital part
of any ISMS ensuring that information security risks are sys-
tematically identified, analyzed and treated in accordance
with an organizationâĂŹs risk appetite.
Over the last years the overall greater need to systemati-
cally comply with information security goals has supported
the raise of a plethora of tools and methods to support all
ranges of information security and information security risk
management activities. For example, there has been sub-
stantial research in the state of practice of specific Infor-
mation Security Management (ISM) and ISRM practices.
The application of information security policies (Bulgurcu
et al., 2010; Fulford and Doherty, 2003; Sommestad et al.,
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2014) or the automation of security controls tomitigate iden-
tified information security risks (Montesino and Fenz, 2011;
Aguirre and Alonso, 2012; Tracy, 2007) as well as the sup-
port of specific risk identification techniques (Beckers, 2015;
Sommestad et al., 2013; Panda, 2009) have been at the center
of attention for more than a decade. Still, the general prac-
tical application and dissemination of these approaches as
well as their integration in existing organizationally estab-
lished ISMSs or ISRM settings, is hard to gauge (Wangen
and Snekkenes, 2013). Part of this situation is due to enter-
prises not readily disclosing their ISRM practices especially
when past missteps might have disrupted their ISM activ-
ities. Furthermore, many of the approaches proposed from
academia target large-sized companies and specific informa-
tion security pains they already face. Thus, they might im-
pose higher-than-acceptable costs for other enterprises. The
resulting inability of enterprises to reliably estimate the cost-
benefit ratio of these highly specialized approaches might
prevent them to justify their implementation, especially in
light of their own pressing information security needs, their
current state of practice and their budgetary boundaries. Con-
sequently, researchers would benefit from a better understand-
ing of the current situation regarding ISM and ISRM to bet-
ter tailor their approaches to a broader audience and ensure
a more general applicability of their results.
While ISM is generally considered a standardized disci-
pline with explicit ISMS standards such as ISO 27001 (ISO,
2013) or the BSI IT Baseline Protection Methodology (BSI,
2017), the actual application within enterprises may vary
greatly thanks to tolerances these standards allow. Apart
from roles, workflow descriptions (which are in case of ISO
27001 rather abstract) and general requirements (which pre-
dominantly state the desired result, not the means to achieve
it) there are no generally agreed upon tools or methods for
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conducting specific riskmanagement activities within ISMSs.
While standards do provide best-practices it is up for organi-
zations to choose the most fitting ones for themselves, which
in turn leads to highly heterogeneous ISMSs even if they are
certified by the same standard.
Research regarding the state of risk management prac-
tices applied within ISMSs is rather limited with prior publi-
cations either narrowly addressing specific aspects, focusing
exclusively on the examinations of management practices, or
investigating singular use cases (cf. Section 2). Wangen and
Snekkenes (2013) further illustrate the overall lack of good
empirical research in the area of ISMS and ISRM. Detailed
studies covering ISRM practices of multiple enterprises in-
cluding workflows, stakeholder collaboration and tool usage
are not available. The goal of this research is therefore to
evaluate the current practice and to identify potential short-
comings in ISM workflows, especially regarding the man-
agement of information security risks. The study at hand
lays the foundation to address the following research objec-
tives:
• Gain comprehensive understanding of the current state
of practice of risk analysis used in Information Secu-
rity Management
• Improve the current organizational information secu-
rity risk analysis practices
• Identify potential means for automatization in current
risk analysis approaches applicable within ISMS set-
tings.
The scope of this exploratory investigation are enterprises
that have either implemented or plan to implement an ISMS
to ensure that all participants apply ISRM on a broader scale
as part of enterprise-wide information security management
practices. Thus, we are not interested in smaller-scope, inde-
pendent, non-information-security-centric risk management
activities. Our study focuses on enterprises operating in the
DACH region (Germany, Austria, Switzerland) primarily due
to the EU GDPR (Council of European Union, 2016b) and
NIS Directive (Council of European Union, 2016a) taking
effect during our investigation period. We therefore pre-
sumed an increased organizational interest in information se-
curity and privacy in that geopolitical area.
With this paper we contribute (1) the design of a detailed
survey to evaluate the current state of risk management prac-
tices conducted as part of organizations ISMSs together with
(2) the study results and analysis for the DACH region as
well as (3) the deduction of potential points for improve-
ment in ISRM practices. Our findings will be further used to
enhance the tool-supported and continuous ISM framework
ADAMANT (Brunner et al., 2019, 2018, 2017).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tions 2 and 3 describe the background and related work of
our research. Section 4 presents the applied research method
and the developed survey instrument. The results of our ex-
ploratory survey are presented in Section 5 before we discuss
our conclusions and recommendations in Section 6. We con-
clude this paper with a summary and outlook on future work
in Section 7.
2. Background
In this section we will present background to our study,
mainly ISMS and ISRM together with relevant standards,
frameworks, and research resources. We will further present
the conceptual model developed to guide our research and
survey design.
2.1. Information Security Management and
Information Security Management Systems
While competing definitions for information security can
be found, a commonly accepted one is provided byWhitman
and Mattord (2011): “Information security is the protection
of information and its critical elements, including the sys-
tems and hardware that use, store, and transmit that infor-
mation”. ISM consequently deals with the implementation
and monitoring of an organization’s desired information se-
curity level. An ISMS is the management tool composed
of interrelated and interacting organizational elements (poli-
cies, processes, roles, etc.) that supports the preservation of
the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information
values and information systems (ISO, 2013). These infor-
mation values and information processing systems are com-
monly referred to as assets and managing an inventory of all
relevant assets is a fundamental requirement for any given
ISMS. ISRM techniques are applied to systematically iden-
tify security risks of these assets, to analyze and evaluate
them and to find proper means to treat the corresponding
risks to information security.
In Figure 1 we present a unified, general mode of opera-
tion at the heart of any ISMS derived from relevant standards
and best practices. Top management will typically set the
overarching goals by defining a strategic information secu-
rity policy and the scope of the ISMS. A broader set of stake-
holders will then be responsible for operationalizing the out-
set goals by conducting a risk analysis, selecting appropriate
counter measures to reduce the risk to the agreed level and
subsequently implementing and operating them. This all is
conducted as part of a continuous improvement cycle with
reporting to top-level management and readjustment when
necessary.
Recognized ISM standards and best practices are the ISO
27k family of standards (ISO, 2013, 2011), the BSI IT Base-
line Protection Methodology (BSI, 2017), the NIST Risk
Management Framework (RMF) (NIST, 2018) and COBIT
(ISACA, 2012). While conceptually slightly different, these
standards follow the described mode of operation and pro-
vide enterprises with useful guidelines. The actual imple-
mentation of said processes or the methods used for certain
ISM and ISRM activities, however, are not mandated. The
ISO 27001 standard, for example, list requirements that or-
ganizations risk assessment processes must meet (cf. ISO
27001, Section 6.1.2), but leaves the actual decision of the
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Figure 1: Generalized ISMS process
risk assessment methodology or the design of the process it-
self open. The BSI Baseline ProtectionMethodology as well
as the NISTRMF on the other handmandate amore concrete
risk assessment strategy starting with (1) a structure analy-
sis to create the asset documentation, (2) the determination
of protection requirements for each asset or group of assets
(classification), (3) the implementation of according base-
line security measures with the potential of (4) conducting
dedicated a risk analysis for sensitive areas. However, the
actual methodology used for the latter dedicated risk analy-
sis is not mandated.
Academic ISM approaches and frameworks tend to par-
tially integrate research results in common standards, often
covering only selected parts or individual management ac-
tivities. ISMS-CORAS (Beckers et al., 2014) and subse-
quent work by Beckers (2015) explores the integration the
model-driven CORAS (Lund et al., 2010) risk management
method into ISO 27001 compliant ISMSs for a smart grid
scenario. Another model-driven approach incorporating en-
terprise architecture models is the Cyber Security Modeling
Language (CySeMoL) (Sommestad et al., 2013). Research
in automation of ISM mainly considers the automation of
security controls by applying heterogeneous sets of techni-
cal solutions to different domains of security controls (Mon-
tesino and Fenz, 2011; Aguirre and Alonso, 2012). A more
differentiated view that includes the automation of required
securitymanagement processes as well is presented by Tracy
(2007) where challenges, approaches and potential rewards
of a security process automation platforms are discussed.
The consideration of risk-aware business processes, theirman-
agement and their actual implementation is the focus of work
by Conforti et al. (2013). In our ownwork we propose a tool-
supported continuous ISMS approach (Brunner et al., 2019)
and empirically evaluated its potential to automate ISMS ac-
tivities (Brunner et al., 2017) and means to introduce it in
actual enterprise settings (Brunner et al., 2018) via multiple
case studies.
2.2. Information Security Risk Management
Information security risk is defined as “potential that a
given threat will exploit vulnerabilities of an asset or group
of assets and thereby cause harm to the organization” (ISO,
2011). A general approach to systematically manage infor-
mation security risks is outlined in the ISO 27005 standard
(ISO, 2011). The same basic building blocks and processes
can be universally identified in nearly all ISRM standards,
best practices and many other information security frame-
works or risk management approaches. In contrast to many
other risk management applications, the actual area of inves-
tigation is not restricted to singular domains (e.g., software
development, IT service operation) or single projects, but
most often covers the whole enterprise or a substantial part
of it as strategically defined by the ISMS scope. Figure 2
illustrates this process which generally consists of 5 differ-
ent activities where (1) context establishment, is followed by
(2) risk assessment, with (3) risk treatment (and possibly ac-
ceptance of residual risks) concluding each iteration. Risks
are further continuously (4) monitored and reviewed and (5)
communicated within organizations.
The first step, context establishment, primarily deals with
the definition of the scope and boundaries of the risk man-
agement initiative as well as providing the organizational
principles to conduct ISRM. In context of an ISMS this step
will be aligned with the respective activities already man-
dated by the applied ISMS standard. Risk assessment in-
cludes the identification of risks, their estimation and eval-
uation. Risk identification will typically involve the docu-
mentation of relevant assets (i.e. within the scope), the iden-
tification of potential threats to and vulnerabilities of these
assets. Taking established security controls into account po-
tential consequences can then be identified resulting in a list
of incident scenarios that might harm an organization’s in-
formation security goals. These risk scenarios require sub-
sequent estimation to assess their actual level of risk where
enterprises can choose from a variety of qualitative (subjec-
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Figure 2: ISRM process according to ISO 27005
tive and scale-based, e.g., critical, high, medium, low) and
quantitative (calculated, e.g., expected annual financial loss)
risk estimation approaches. This step will commonly in-
clude the determination of each risk’s consequence and its
respective likelihood. Depending on an organization’s risk
acceptance criteria, all information security risks above the
agreed threshold will require proper risk treatment. If pos-
sible and financially reasonable organization will define ad-
ditional controls to reduce these risks to finally reach a sat-
isfactory residual risk level. The monitoring of information
security risks and review of security controls until the next
cycle concludes each risk management iteration. The con-
tinuous communication of information security risks and all
information obtained from risk management activities is of
crucial importance to ensure timely coordination between
involved stakeholders.
Established general-purpose ISRMstandards include ISO
27005 (ISO, 2011), the NIST SP800-30 Guidelines (NIST,
2002) and the RiskIT Framework (ISACA, 2009). Other
management standards with a heavy emphasis on ISRM are
the BSI IT Baseline Protection Methodology (BSI, 2017),
COBIT (ISACA, 2012), Information Technology Infrastruc-
ture Library (ITIL) (Long, 2012) and the Common Crite-
ria for Information Security Evaluation (The Common Cri-
teria Recognition Agreement Members, 2006). Additional
domain-specific standards cover ISRM practices, although
within a more limited scope and typically present a special-
ization of a general-purpose standard for a given domain.
Research has produced a variety of ISRM techniques.
The more established ones with information security focus
are ISRAM (Karabacak and Sogukpinar, 2005), CRAMM
(Yazar, 2002), OCTAVE (Panda, 2009), CORAS (Lund et al.,
2010) and UMLsec (Jürjens, 2002) with the latter ones em-
phasizing formal model-driven approaches. They require a
greater effort to build and maintain adequate system and en-
terprise models, but simultaneously offer features for formal
security analysis. More general-purpose techniques, primar-
ily considered in risk assessment, are Failure Mode and Ef-
fect Analysis (FMEA), Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA),
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) or Hazard and Operability Study
(HAZOP) which all heavily rely on stakeholder expertise
and have less stringent documentation andmodeling require-
ments.
Automation in ISRM is researched from different per-
spectives. An approach to automatically identify adequate
security requirements based on an asset model of the sys-
tem under investigation has been presented by Pasquale et al.
(2016). Adaptive ISRMapproaches enhance support for deal-
ing with changes of assets as well the threat landscape (Ben-
naceur et al., 2014). Automated risk analysis techniques us-
ing data flow analysis in business process models has been
proposed by Accorsi and Lehmann (2012) and Berger et al.
(2016). A tool-based approach automating threat analysis
has been presented by Schaad and Borozdin (2012) but is
strictly limited to asses software architectures. Due to the
specialized nature of these approaches (either with regard to
documentation effort, required stakeholder expertise or gen-
eral applicability), none of them could have been directly
evaluated in context of an organization’s much more expan-
sive ISMS.
2.3. Conceptual Model
The goal of our study was the determination of the status
quo concerning risk management practices in ISM. As such
we need to investigate the different approaches applied by
enterprises to tackle risk management activities from mul-
tiple viewpoints. We thus developed a model from multi-
ple ISRM and ISMS standards and scientific publications.
In addition we consulted multiple well-received practitioner
guidelines in the information security management domain
such asDisterer (2013); Schou andHernandez (2015); Calder
andWatkins (2012); Watkins (2013) and more. The concep-
tual model shown in Figure 3 illustrates how we conceptu-
alize major activities, the relevant application environment
and relations in between them.
The established ISMS or information security organi-
zation defines the scope of all conducted risk management
Michael Brunner et al.: Preprint submitted to Elsevier Journal of Computers & Security Page 4 of 32
Risk Management Practices in Information Security: Exploring the Status Quo in the DACH Region
Documentation
Artefacts
Activities Risk Treatment, Security Controls
Risk Estimation 
and Evaluation
Risk 
Identification
Asset 
Documentation
Data Sources
Stakeholders
Methods
Tools
Information Security Organization / Information Security Management System
mandates provides
requires | processes | provides
st
or
ed
 in
su
pp
or
t
interfaces | provides access
applied for
conduct |  involved
useuse | collaborate via
collaborate with
Figure 3: Conceptual model for ISRM practices used in ISM
activities and will mandate methods to be applied in each
step. Each method will require certain documentation arti-
facts which, in our conceptual model, are any formally or
informally documented collections of information required
for any given risk management activity. This includes high-
level information security management policies (e.g., defin-
ing the scope and strategic alignment of an organization’s
information security activities) provided by the overarching
ISMS as well as all information being collected, provided,
and potentially enriched by applied risk management meth-
ods. To gather a comprehensive picture we further distin-
guish between application of methods in distinct risk man-
agement activities. Expected documentation artifacts for as-
set documentation will include hardware inventories, pro-
cess documentation or network plans, whereas risk identifi-
cation will additionally deal with threats and vulnerabilities
and provide documentation artifacts regarding risk scenar-
ios. These will be enriched with a risk rating via risk esti-
mation methods. Risk treatment will finally provide security
controls as means to mitigate unacceptably high risks in ac-
cordance with an organization’s risk treatment plan.
Different sets of stakeholders conduct risk management
activities and utilize tools and datasources to complete their
respective tasks. Tools will support one or more tasks and
can be used as direct means to perform them (e.g., vulner-
ability scanner to identify vulnerabilities of an asset) or to
orchestrate stakeholder collaboration (e.g., wiki to discuss
individual risk ratings and reach a conclusive decision). Var-
ious data sources can be either directly used by stakeholders
(e.g., vendor-specific security advisories) or interfaced by
dedicated tools (e.g., vulnerability scanner integrates vendor-
specific vulnerability database). Furthermore, different data
sources can be used to store relevant documentation artifacts.
By investigating the concepts in this model – the char-
acteristics of each element and their relationships in actual
organizational settings – we can develop an encompassing
picture of the current state of ISRM practices in ISM and
identify potential challenges to be addressed in future re-
search.
3. Related Work
Several studies have investigated the state of practice re-
garding ISM and ISRM. Investigations exploring the status
quo on a broader setting are limited. Commonly research
is restricted to individual aspects or individual risk manage-
ment practices. In the following, we will thus discuss studies
that we deem closely related to our research endeavor. These
empirical studies include exploratory investigations, quanti-
tative surveys, qualitative expert interviews, industrial case
studies and systematic literature reviews. However, not all
of them might necessarily cover the whole area of ISM or
all aspects in ISRM.
The very stakeholder-centric point-of-view regarding in-
formation security policies, their implementation, percep-
tion and impact has been empirically and exploratory in-
vestigated in multiple articles. A study analyzing the dif-
ferences in stakeholder perception regarding security poli-
cies has been conducted by Samonas et al. (2020). Com-
pliance with and employees adherence to information secu-
rity policies was investigated by Ifinedo (2014, 2012) and
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Sikolia et al. (2016). Sommestad et al. conducted two note-
worthy studies starting with the identification of variables
influencing compliance with information security policies
of organizations (Sommestad et al., 2014) and a further in-
vestigation assessing the theory of planned behavior to ex-
plain policy compliance (Sommestad et al., 2015). All listed
articles try to shed light into employees willingness to fol-
low information security policies and how to increase their
adoption in organizational settings. Theoretical models that
have been applied include the Theory of Planned Behavior
(TPB) and Protction Motivation Theory (PMT). Apart from
Sikolia et al. (2016) most study results have been derived
from smaller investigations either covering a singular orga-
nization or surveys with small sets of participants. Gener-
alizability of findings has to be considered in need of im-
provement with studies pointing to heavy influences from
distinct organizational settings. Nearly all studies conclude
that top-management commitment is one of the most impor-
tant drivers of information security compliance in organiza-
tions.
Research regarding stakeholder participation in ISRM
practices and its influence in context of regulatory compli-
ance has been presented by Spears and Barki (2010). Rees
and Allen (2008) and Montesdioca and Maçada (2015) con-
ducted surveys to investigate the user satisfaction with infor-
mation security and risk management practices. Other ex-
ploratory studies investigating the role of stakeholder knowl-
edge for assessing data quality of documentation artifacts
used in ISRM or for the expanded endeavor of Governance,
Risk Management and Compliance (GRC) activities have
been conducted by Sillaber and Breu (2015); Sillaber et al.
(2019). These studies primarily investigate the satisfaction
of various stakeholders with specific ISRM practices or their
respective results. They do not provide a substantial inves-
tigation of these practices themselves, how they are imple-
mented, which tools are used or which collaboration patterns
are applied.
Moreover, a few empirical studies by Sauerwein et al.
analyze the use of external and internal security information
sources for ISRM processes. For example, Sauerwein et al.
(2019) provides a comprehensive analysis of these informa-
tion security sources used in research and practice. Most of
these sources are unstructured and used in an ad-hoc manner
by employees as input for critical information security and
risk management processes without formal approval. Sauer-
wein et al. (2018) empirically investigates this phenomenon
and describes it as shadow threat intelligence.
Academic studies concerning the overall state of prac-
tice in ISMSs are sparse. The influence of organizational
culture on ISMS efficiency was analyzed by Chang and Lin
(2007). The quality of information security management
and implemented controls has been the focus of Baker and
Wallace (2007). Several case studies focusing on subtopics
of ISRM from an organizational perspective can be identi-
fied. These case studies include investigations on how or-
ganizations conduct information security assessments based
on standards (Shedden et al., 2006), how security risk as-
sessment methods can more efficiently identify and treat the
knowledge associatedwith business processes (Shedden et al.,
2011) and the potential for improved asset identification en-
abled by the RichDescriptionMethod (RDM) (Shedden et al.,
2016). A case-study based comparison of ISMSs has been
conducted by van Wessel et al. (2011) by investigating their
implementation and impact in European and Chinese enter-
prises. Barlette and Fomin (2010) conducted research into
general international ISMS adoption and derived correspond-
ing drivers and success factors. These studies at most con-
sider the ISMS standard used by organizations and do not
distinguish between differences in their implementation. Over-
all, we could not identify reliable research regarding actual
ISMS implementations, tool utilization and orchestration of
stakeholder collaboration. In addition, many of other avail-
able studies such as Fitzgerald (2007); Pierce et al. (2008);
Hooper and McKissack (2016) primarily focus on the ISMS
top-management perspective. They exclusively involve roles
such as Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) or Chief
InformationOfficer (CIO) and capture only parts of the ISMS
and ISRM activities under direct supervision of these sub-
jects.
Several researchers conducted empirical or literature stud-
ies to identify issues and challenges in ISM and ISRM. In
this context, Fenz et al. (2014) outline current challenges in
ISRM,Wangen and Snekkenes (2013) introduce a taxonomy
of challenges in ISRM, Wangen (2016) documents several
issues concerning the application of qualitative and quanti-
tative methods in ISRM practice, Soomro et al. (2016) argue
the need of a more holistic approach for ISM andWebb et al.
(2014) highlight deficiencies in the practice of information
security risk assessment that lead to poor decision making
and inadequate security strategies.
Looking beyond empirical studies performed in academic
contexts, we identified several related whitepapers and re-
ports published by IT and management consulting compa-
nies such as PWC (2015), Deloitte (2017), Ernst & Young
(2018) orMicrosoft (2019). Other viable resources are avail-
able from common interest groups such as ENISA (2015) or
SANS Institute (2019). Considering obvious financial mo-
tives behind most of these studies, their conclusions should
be critically questioned. However, certain reoccurring sub-
jects in these studies are notable and corroborate academic
findings such as challenges in reliably evaluating an orga-
nization’s risk exposure and the alignment of business and
technical perspectives. The continuous evaluation of sys-
tems within information security management and risk as-
sessment is another open and reoccurring challenge that –
in light of more flexible supply chains, increase in usage of
distributed services and an overall increase in information
system complexity – requires further attention.
The available body of academic (and also non-academic)
research is inconclusive to fully address our research objec-
tives stated in Section 1. We thus conducted a thorough em-
pirical and exploratory investigation into the current state
of practice regarding ISRM practices in ISM. Contrary to
available research, a broader study that emphasizes not just
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the strategic and top-management roles’ perspective but that
draws a conclusive picture of actually implemented riskman-
agement practices including used methods, tools, documen-
tation artifacts and collaboration patterns is required to better
guide future research in this domain.
4. Research Method
We used an anonymous online survey instrument for the
purpose of this exploratory investigation and followed re-
spected guidelines for the design and execution of our re-
search (Pfleeger and Kitchenham, 2001; Kasunic, 2005) and
proactively addressed challenges in survey research (Wagner
et al., 2019). A pilot questionnaire and a subsequent inter-
view with an experienced ISMS manager were conducted to
ensure the validity and content as well as the general usabil-
ity of the developed survey instrument. Received feedback
allowed us to make a few minor changes to some multiple
choice answer options. In this section, we present the final
results of our study design process.
4.1. Research Questions
Our primary research goal was to gain insight into the
current state of risk management practices in ISM and to use
this information to further identify practical and directly ap-
plicable means for improvement. Considering the sensitive
topic at hand we refrained from directly asking study partic-
ipants to reveal the inner workings of their ISMS and espe-
cially their risk management practices. In addition, the ex-
pected heterogeneous nature of these processes would have
further complicated the design of an efficient online survey.
Instead, we developed an approach to collect vital infor-
mation regarding our research objectives which will not re-
quire study participants to disclose sensitive information. In
accordance to our conceptual model (cf. Section 2.3) we set
the focal point of our investigation on the considered arti-
facts, involved roles, methods and tools which further proved
to be a more reliable way to collect the desired data during
initial pilot interviews. We consecutively derived the follow-
ing research questions for our survey:
RQ1 What methods and documentation artifacts are con-
sidered for risk analysis in ISMS?
RQ2 Which stakeholders are involved in the risk analysis
and how do they cooperate?
RQ3 What information sources and tools are used for risk
analysis in ISMS?
By investigating these research questions we can gain a bet-
ter understanding of the current state of practice and iden-
tify potential areas for improvement with regard to stake-
holder collaboration, artifact documentation and tool usage
in ISRM activities.
4.2. Instrument
We structured our online questionnaire in six question
blocks. These cover demographics (DE), general informa-
tion security management practices (IM), asset documenta-
tion (AS), risk identification (RI), risk estimation and evalu-
ation (RE) and the documentation of security requirement
and controls (SE). Overall, the questionnaire contains 45
questions and was aimed at 20 minutes duration for com-
pletion.
Table 1 shows an excerpt of the designed survey, the
complete survey instrument is provided in Appendix A. The
table’s first column contains the question ID which is super-
seded by a question block indicator. The second column con-
tains the question itself. The last column shows the type of
question: Single choice, Multiple choice, Yes/No, Numeric,
Rating, Ranking and Open. Ratings are used to inquiry spe-
cific implementation aspects of different ISRM tasks (e.g.,
"Risk identification is performed automatically."). We used
an ordinal scale of 4 ("Applies fully", "Appliesmostly", "Ap-
plies to some extend", "Does not apply") with the additional
option "Do not know" to capture when participants were not
knowledgeable. Rankings were used to capture the impor-
tance of utilized tools following multiple-choice questions
where more than 5 options were provided (cf. questions
RI003 and RI004 in Table 1). If a single or multiple choice
question allowed participants to extend answer options via
a dedicated text input it is marked with + and if participant
were able to provide an additional comment to a question this
marked with * respectively. Both options were used to allow
participants to express company-specific deviations and ad-
ditions.
Due to natural differences between enterprises already
operating an ISMS, and those still in the planning phase, as
well as participant involvement in and knowledge of dedi-
cated ISM activities we implemented alternative paths in our
survey. Questions with subscript "alt" were only shown to
participants which answered previous questions to the neg-
ative (e.g., IM002alt and IM003alt were shown to partici-pant not operating an ISMS instead of questions IM002 to
IM005).
Each question block was further complemented by de-
scriptive text providing additional context for every question.
Terms and definitions used throughout the questionnaire and
within this descriptive blocks were taken from the ISO 27k
family of standards (ISO, 2013). The description for the risk
identification block is provided as example below:
This group of questions asks specifics about the
Information Security RiskManagement (ISRM)
approach at your organization. In particular these
questions target the way how risks are identi-
fied at your organization as part of your ISMS or
ISRM initiative. According to ISO 27005 Risk
Identification is "[...] the process to find, list and
characterize elements of risk".
Apart from the question block for demographics, each
block contains dedicated questions directly linked to our re-
search questions. We ask participants for applied methods
and characteristics of documentation artifacts (RQ1), involved
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Table 1
Survey Questions (excerpt)
Id Question Type
DE001 What is your organizational role? Multiple+
DE002 Which of the following personal certifications and qualifications do you have? Multiple+
DE003 How many years of professional experience in the area of information security do you have? Numeric
DE004 What type of industry is your organization in? Single+
DE005 What is the size of your organization? Single
. . . . . . . . .
IM001 Do you operate an Information Security Management System (ISMS)? Single*
IM002 What is the most important driver for Information Security Management in your organization? Multiple+
IM003 Which Information Security Risk Management (ISRM) methodology does your organization apply? Multiple+
IM004 How often does your organization conduct an information security risk management cycle? Multiple+
IM005 Which events additionally trigger information security risk management activities in your organization? Multiple+
IM002alt What do you consider the most important driver for Information Security Management? Multiple+
IM003alt Which Information Security Risk Management (ISRM) methodology do you know? Multiple+. . . . . . . . .
RI000 Does your organization perform Information Security Risk Management (ISRM) or related activities? Yes/No
RI001 Rate the following statements with regard to the information security risk identification approach of
your organization.
Rating
Stmt1 Risk identification is performed automatically.
Stmt2 Every relevant security risk is identified in a timely fashion.
Stmt3 Sharing of relevant security information is conducted via a formal process.
Stmt4 Relevant security information is automatically preprocessed and filtered for conducting risk identifi-
cation.
Stmt5 Exchange of security information with other organizations and individuals has been beneficial for risk
identification.
RI002 Which aspects are considered for information security risk identification in your organization? Multiple+
RI003 Which EXTERNAL information sources are used for information security risk identification in your
organization?
Multiple+
RI004 Which are the three most important EXTERNAL information sources for information security risk
identification in your organization?
Ranking
. . . . . . . . .
RI011 What are the most pressing challenges during information security risk identification for your organi-
zation?
Open
. . . . . . . . .
stakeholders as well as their mode of collaboration (RQ2)
and used data sources and tools (RQ3).
4.3. Data Collection Procedure
Our target audience were companies and organizations
which had already established an ISMS or were planning to
do so in the near future. We explicitly did not focus on com-
panies which already operated a certified ISMS since this
would greatly decrease our potential survey population with-
out necessarily raising the result quality for this exploratory
investigation. Targeted participants were stakeholders being
responsible or involved in strategic or operational ISM activ-
ities at these companies. Again, we did not exclusively tar-
get top management information security roles (e.g., CISO,
CIO) as this would have unnecessarily restricted our popu-
lation and would potentially lead to a more strategic point of
view instead of the targeted practical one. Furthermore, top
level ISM roles are not guaranteed to be in place at targeted
companies, especially the ones who are currently introduc-
ing or only planning to implement an ISMS.
Participants were acquired throughmultiple channels. We
invited participants from Austrian research transfer projects
Qualifizierungsnetzwerk-West (Q-West), Digital TourismEx-
perts (DTE) andDigitalisierung und Sicherheit (DuS). These
were prime candidates as they attended practical information
security management courses covering various risk manage-
ment practices with the clear intention to either introduce
systematic ISM in their organizations or improve their cur-
rent ISRM practices. In addition we invited German infor-
mation security experts through a dedicated security com-
mon interest group’s mailing list. Finally, we directly con-
tacted and invited respected ISM and ISRM experts from in-
dustry. The data collection phase for these participant groups
diverged and is shown in the data collection overview in Ta-
ble 2. In total, 351 participants were invited betweenNovem-
ber 2017 and July 2019. Invitations were delivered via e-
mail and all participants were informed upfront that responses
were collected anonymously. The used invitation letter is
provided in Appendix B. We used the same self-hosted and
administrated survey tool instance (Lime Survey – https:
//www.limesurvey.org) for all participant groups.
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Table 2
Data collection (overview)
Group Country Invited Data collection phase
Q-West Austria 34 2017-11 – 2018-01
DTE Austria 43 2018-05 – 2018-10
DuS Austria 46 2019-07 – 2019-09
Security
Interest
Group
Germany ~200 2018-05 – 2019-09
Direct DACH 28 2017-11 – 2018-12
Table 3
Mapping between research and survey questions
Research Question Survey Questions
RQ1 What methods and doc-
umentation artifacts are
considered for risk analy-
sis in ISMS?
IM001, IM002, IM003,
IM004, IM005, AS001,
AS002, RI001, RI002,
RI010, RE004, RE005,
RE006, RE007, RE009,
SE001, SE006
RQ2 Which stakeholders are
involved in the risk anal-
ysis and how do they co-
operate?
RI007, RI008, RI009,
RE001, RE002, RE003,
SE002, SE003
RQ3 What data sources and
tools are used for risk
analysis in ISMS?
AS003, RI003, RI004,
RI005, RI006, SE004,
SE005
— Challenges in respective
areas
RI011, RE008, SE007
4.4. Data Analysis Procedure
Data analysis was, due to the use of an online question-
naire and export capabilities of the survey tool, straight for-
ward. Responseswere exported and briefly checked for com-
pleteness and consistency. Obviously incomplete responses
were removed. That concerned responses where less than
66% of questions were answered or participants made ex-
cessive use of ignoring all non-mandatory questions. Fur-
thermore all responses were discarded where participants
showed no knowledge of any concerned ISRM activity (e.g.,
answering "I do not know" for all statement ratings in mul-
tiple question blocks like RI001 shown in Table 1).
We then conducted a qualitative analysis of the remain-
ing responses, created descriptive statistics and examined
response patterns. We prepared appropriate graphical pre-
sentations. The data was summarized and reported for all
questions in the survey to address our research questions.
Table 3 shows the mapping between our research and sur-
vey questions. Finally, we applied manual blocking to our
results. Our main area of interest were differences between
enterprises operating an ISMS and those planning to do so.
4.5. Validity Procedure
We performed several steps to check and ensure the va-
lidity of our research. Considering the often heterogeneous
nature of implemented ISMand ISRMactivities and the some-
times ambiguous use of terms, we used the generally ac-
cepted ISO 27005 standard (ISO, 2011) as referential basis
for our survey. All terms were clarified by additional de-
scriptions for each question block and participant were given
ample opportunity to state any issues within free-text com-
ment blocks. We further performed a small pilot study and
incorporated received feedback prior to the distribution of
our questionnaire. Finally, during data analysis we planned
to discard any results of questionable quality where partici-
pants made multiple obviously conflicting statements. This
quality assurance step was primarily intended for responses
where participants stated to operate a certified ISMS or stan-
dardizes ISRMapproach but would not perform basicmanda-
tory activities, completely neglect required asset types, or
resign to manage documentation artifacts demanded by the
certified standard (e.g., operate an ISO 27001 compliant ISMS
but not document security controls, operating an ISMS but
not performing any kind of risk identification).
5. Results
In this section, we present the survey results in relation
with our research questions. We additionally address differ-
ences between companies with and without an established
ISMS.
5.1. Study Population
In total, we collected 64 responses of which 26 were
processed for data analysis. The other 38 responses were
dropped with the majority having aborted the survey within
the first question block (cf. Section 4.4). No responses had
to be dropped due to obviously conflicting statements (cf.
Section 4.5). Considering the amount of forwarded invita-
tions we reached a response rate of 7% which is comparable
to other exploratory surveys (cf. Section 3) in this field. The
remainder of this section presents the results derived from
the 26 complete responses.
Participants
Of our participants, 8 gave CISO or CIO as their organi-
zational role with additional 4 participants being employed
as head of IT department. This amounts to roughly one third
of responses from higher-level management. Other partici-
pants mainly worked in dedicated security or risk manage-
ment roles and in software development. Figure 4 shows
the overall picture of participant roles as well as their qual-
ifications. 20 participants had obtained a university degree
in either science, technology, engineering and mathematics
(STEM), system management or business programs. 8 par-
ticipants had additionally obtained specialized personal se-
curity qualifications like Certified Information Systems Se-
curity Professional (CISSP) or Certified Information Secu-
rity Manager (CISM). Participants stated an average of 6.7
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Additional Security Qualification
31 %
Meta Data
VALUE (Average) Deviation min max
Participants 26
Completed 23
First Participant 18.09.17 14:41
Last participant 09.08.19 06:49
Time [min] 18,79 8,75 5,37 50,36
Participants
VALUE (Average) Deviation min max
Organizational 
Role
CIO 5
CISO 3
CTO 0
Head of IT Department 4
Security Manager 5
Security Analyst 1
Security Engineer 1
Security Consultant 2
Risk Manager 3
Quality Manager 3
Compliance Manager 0
Software/Systems/Network Engineer 3
Software/Systems/Network Architect 4
Software Developer 3
Other 2 Product Manager
Personal 
Qualifications
CISM 2
CISP 4
CEH 0
CCNP 1
CISA 0
U Deg CS 7
U Deg SM 3
U Deg Busi 7
Other 5 DI (FH) Elektrotechnik, MA Arts in Business, PhD in Physics, 
ISO 27001 internal auditor
[None] 6
InfSec Experience 6,70 4,17 1,00 18,00
Companies
VALUE
Industry Type Information Technology 8
Services 2
Manufacturing 7
Retail 0
Finance and Insurance 3
Public Administration 0
Other 6 Automation Software, Different, Utility
Size < 10 employees 4
10 - 50 employees 1
50 - 250 employees 11
> 250 employees 10
Country Germany 2
Austria 23
Switzerland 1
Liechtenstein 0
Other EU Country 0
Non EU Country 0
ICT Standards ISO 27K 11
COBIT 1
ITIL 8
ValIT 0
BSI IT Baseline 7
Other 5 Energy, Pharma
[NONE] 6
Information Security Management
VALUE alt Total
Operate ISMS? I do not know 3
No, and we do not  
plan to implement an ISMS
7
No, but we plan  
to implement an ISMS
6
Yes, we operate  
a non-certified ISMS
7
Yes, we operate  
a certified ISMS
3
Comments Implementing Security for IIOT and IOT device deployment out of a cloud platform
Most important 
driver
Higher degree of information security 3 0 3
Customer demands 6 3 9
Shareholder demands 1 0 1
Regulatory demands 6 4 10
[NOT SPECIFIED] 10 19 3
Comments
ISRM ISO 27005 5 3 8
ISO 31000 1 0 1
BSI IT Baseline Protection Methodology4 3 7
 NIST SP 800 30 0 1 1
CRAMM 0 0 0
OCTAVE 0 0 0
AS/NZS 4360 0 0 0
CRISAM 4 0 4
Other 2 to be defined, non
RM Cycle Never 8
At least twice a year 3
At least once a year 3
At least once every two years 2
Occasionally (more than two years between cycles)3
[NOT SPECIFIED] 7
RM Trigger Events Change of the operational Environment (Process, IT Infrastructure, …)4
Reported Security Incident or vulnerability (external)9
Attack of IT infrastructure, applications or services (internal)6
Internal Audit 6
External Audit 6
Penetration Tests 1 Penetrations Tests
Participants - condensed
CxO 8 30,77 %
Head of IT Department 4 15,38 %
Dedicated Security Role 9 34,62 %
Software Development 10 38,46 %
Risk Manager 3 11,54 %
Quality Manager 3 11,54 %
Product Manager 2 7,69 %
Additional Security Qualification 8
NONE 18
STEM 8
System 
Mgmt.
4
Business 8
NONE 6
Roles
Product Manager
5 %
Quality Manager
8 %
Risk Manager
8 %
Software Development
26 %
Dedicated Security Role
23 %
Head of IT Department
10 %CxO21 %
Qualifications
NONE
23 %
Business
31 %
System 
Mgmt.
15 %
STEM
31 %
Other
23 %
Finance and Insurance
12 %
Manufacturing
27 %
Services
8 %
Information Technology
31 %
> 250 employees
38 %
50 - 250 employees
42 %
10 - 50 employees
4 %
< 10 employees
15 %
0 3 6 9 12
Asset Management
Perform Asset DocumentationYES 16
NO 7
N/A 3
Asset documentation is orchestrated in a centralized mannerApplies fully 4
Applies mostly 7
Applies to some extent 5
Does not apply 1
Do not know 1
N/A 8
We keep records of all individual assetsApplies f lly 3
Applies mostly 2
Applies to some extent 8
Does not apply 1
Do not know 2
N/A 10
Considered Assets (actual)
Yes No N/A
Business Processes 13 6 7
Organizational Units 6 13 7
Suppliers 6 13 7
Stakeholders 5 14 7
IT Services 14 5 7
Applications 14 5 7
Cloud Services (external) 5 14 7
Server Hardware 15 4 7
Workstations 13 6 7
POI/POS Terminals 5 14 7
Network Infrastructure 15 4 7
Premises 6 13 7
Rooms 8 11 7
Other Software Design
NONE 1 18 7
Considered Assets (hypothetical)
Yes No N/A
Business Processes 3 4 19
Organizational Units 1 6 19
Suppliers 1 6 19
Stakeholders 0 7 19
IT Services 4 3 19
Applications 3 4 19
Cloud Services (external) 3 4 19
Server Hardware 3 4 19
Workstations 3 4 19
POI/POS Terminals 1 6 19
Network Infrastructure 3 4 19
Premises 1 6 19
Rooms 1 6 19
Other
Asset Documentation Tools (hypothetical)
Yes No N/A
ISO 27k
COBIT
ITIL
BSI IT Baseline Methodology
Other
None
Yes, we operate 
a certified ISMS
12 %
Yes, we operate 
a non-certified ISMS
27 %
No, but we plan 
to implement an ISMS
23 %
No, and we do not 
plan to implement an ISMS
27 %
I do not know
12 %
0 2,5 5 7,5 10
0 2,25 4,5 6,75 9
Change of the operational Environment
Reported Security Incident or vulnerability (external)
Attack of IT infrastructure, applications or services (internal)
Internal Audit
External Audit
Penetration Tests
Higher degree of information security
Customer demands
Shareholder demands
Regulatory demands
1
Figure 4: Participant roles and qualifications (푁 = 26)
Table 4
Business domains of responding companies (푁 = 26)
Business Domain Companies
Information Technology 9 (34%)
Manufacturing 8 (31%)
Finance and Insurance 3 (11%)
Services 2 (8%)
Utilities 2 (8%)
Healthcare 1 (4%)
not disclosed 1 (4%)
Table 5
Sizes of responding companies (푁 = 26)
Size Companies
less than 10 employees 4 (15%)
10 - 50 employees 1 (4%)
50 - 250 employees 11 (42%)
more than 250 employees 10 (39%)
years of professional experience in information security (de-
viation: 4.17, min: 1 year, max 18 years). While we cannot
guarantee that multiple participants from one company con-
tributed to our data set, the analyzed responses (and differ-
ences in answers) indicate that this was not the case.
Companies
The most prominent business domains in our data set
were “Information Technology” (9 organizations, 34%) and
“Manufacturing” (8 organizations, 31%). Medium-sized (50-
250 employees) and large (more than 250 employees) com-
panies made up the majority of responses. Tables 4 and 5
show the results regarding business domain and company
size. The majority of responses was provided from Austrian
companies (88%), although 20% of them operate interna-
Additional Security Qualification
31 %
Meta Data
VALUE (Average) Deviation min max
Participants 26
Completed 23
First Participant 18.09.17 14:41
Last participant 09.08.19 06:49
Time [min] 18,79 8,75 5,37 50,36
Participants
VALUE (Average) Deviation min max
Organizational 
Role
CIO 5
CISO 3
CTO 0
Head of IT Department 4
Security Manager 5
Security Analyst 1
Security En ineer 1
Security Consultant 2
Risk Manager 3
Quality Manager 3
Compliance Manager 0
Software/Systems/Network Engineer 3
Software/Systems/Network Architect 4
Software Developer 3
Other 2 Product Manager
Personal 
Qualifications
CISM 2
CISP 4
CEH 0
CCNP 1
CISA 0
U Deg CS 7
U Deg SM 3
U Deg Busi 7
Other 5 DI (FH) Elektrotechnik, MA Arts in Business, PhD in Physics, 
ISO 27001 internal auditor
[None] 6
InfSec Experience 6,70 4,17 1,00 18,00
Companies
VALUE
Industry Type Information Technology 8
Services 2
Manufacturing 7
Retail 0
Finance and Insurance 3
Public Administration 0
Other 6 Automation Software, Different, Utility
Size < 10 employees 4
10 - 50 employees 1
50 - 250 employees 11
> 250 employees 10
Country Germany 2
Austria 23
Switzerland 1
Liechtenstein 0
Other EU Country 0
Non EU Country 0
ICT Standards ISO 27K 11
C BIT 1
ITIL 8
ValIT 0
BSI IT Baseline 7
Other 5 Energy, Pharma
[NONE] 6
Information Security Management
VALUE alt Total
Operate ISMS? I do not know 3
No, and we do not  
plan to implement an ISMS
7
No, but we plan  
to implement an ISMS
6
Yes, we operate  
a non-certified ISMS
7
Yes, we operate  
a certified ISMS
3
Comments Implementing Security for IIOT and IOT device deployment out of a cloud platform
Most important 
driver
Higher degree of information security 3 0 3
Customer demands 6 3 9
Shareholder demands 1 0 1
Regulatory demands 6 4 10
[NOT SPECIFIED] 10 19 3
Comments
ISRM ISO 27005 5 3 8
ISO 31000 1 0 1
BSI IT Baseline Protection Methodology4 3 7
 NIST SP 800 30 0 1 1
CRAMM 0 0 0
OCTAVE 0 0 0
AS/NZS 4360 0 0 0
CRISAM 4 0 4
Other 2 to be defined, non
RM Cycle Never 8
At least twice a year 3
At least once a year 3
At least once every two years 2
Occasionally (more than two years between cycles)3
[NOT SPECIFIED] 7
RM Trigger Events Change of the operational Environment (Process, IT Infrastructure, …)4
Reported Security Incident or vulnerability (external)9
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Internal Audit 6
External Audit 6
Penetration Tests 1 Penetrations Tests
Participants - condensed
CxO 8 30,77 %
Head of IT Department 4 15,38 %
Dedicated Security Role 9 34,62 %
Software Development 10 38,46 %
Risk Manager 3 11,54 %
Quality Manager 3 11,54 %
Product Manager 2 7,69 %
Additional Security Qualification 8
NONE 18
STEM 8
System 
Mgmt.
4
Business 8
NONE 6
Roles
Product Manager
5 %
Quality Manager
8 %
Risk Manager
8 %
Software Development
26 %
Dedicated Security Role
23 %
Head of IT Department
10 %CxO21 %
Qualifications
NONE
23 %
Business
31 %
System 
Mgmt.
15 %
STEM
31 %
Other
23 %
Finance and Insurance
12 %
Manufacturing
27 %
Services
8 %
Information Technology
31 %
> 250 employees
38 %
50 - 250 employees
42 %
10 - 50 employees
4 %
< 10 employees
15 %
0 3 6 9 12
Asset Management
Perform Asset DocumentationYES 16
NO 7
N/A 3
Asset documentation is orchestrated in a centralized mannerApplies fully 4
Applies mostly 7
Applies to some extent 5
Does not apply 1
Do not know 1
N/A 8
We keep records of all individual assetsApplies f lly 3
Applies mostly 2
Applies to some extent 8
Does not apply 1
Do not know 2
N/A 10
Considered Assets (actual)
Yes No N/A
Business Processes 13 6 7
Organizational Units 6 13 7
Suppliers 6 13 7
Stakeholders 5 14 7
IT Services 14 5 7
Applications 14 5 7
Cloud Services (external) 5 14 7
Server Hardware 15 4 7
Workstations 13 6 7
POI/POS Terminals 5 14 7
Network Infrastructure 15 4 7
Premises 6 13 7
Rooms 8 11 7
Other Software Design
NONE 1 18 7
Considered Assets (hypothetical)
Yes No N/A
Business Processes 3 4 19
Organizational Units 1 6 19
Suppliers 1 6 19
Stakeholders 0 7 19
IT Services 4 3 19
Applications 3 4 19
Cloud Services (external) 3 4 19
Server Hardware 3 4 19
Workstations 3 4 19
POI/POS Terminals 1 6 19
Network Infrastructure 3 4 19
Premises 1 6 19
Rooms 1 6 19
Other
Asset Documentation Tools (hypothetical)
Yes No N/A
ISO 27k
COBIT
ITIL
BSI IT Baseline Methodology
Other
None
Yes, we operate 
a certified ISMS
12 %
Yes, we operate 
a non-certified ISMS
27 %
No, but we plan 
to implement an ISMS
23 %
No, and we do not 
plan to implement an ISMS
27 %
I do not k ow
12 %
0 2,5 5 7,5 10
ISMS established or planned No ISMS planned
0 2,25 4,5 6,75 9
Change of the operational Environment
Reported Security Incident or vulnerability (external)
Attack of IT infrastructure, applications or services (internal)
Internal Audit
External Audit
Penetration Tests
Higher degree of information security
Customer demands
Shareholder demands
Regulatory demands
0 3 6 9 12
ISO 27k
COBIT
ITIL
BSI IT Baseline Methodology
Other
None
1
Figure 5: ICT Standards being partially implemented (푁 = 26)
tionally with subsidiaries in at least one other EU or non-EU
country as well.
When asked about implemented ICT standards, partic-
ipants of 11 companies (42%) stated that they at least par-
tially implement some standard of the ISO 27k family with
another 7 companies (27%) using the BSI IT Baseline Pro-
tection Methodology or at least parts of it. COBIT is only
used by one internationally operating, large enterprise. Stan-
dardized IT service management is a concern for 8 com-
panies (31%) as can be seen by the high adoption rate of
the ITIL. Other ICT standards directly named by partici-
pants concerned domain-specific requirements for utility or
healthcare enterprises. Figure 5 illustrates these results.
Response Fragmentation
Our survey was designed in a way that participants were
shown alternative questions if they did not implement spe-
cific ISRM activities in their organizations. The reasoning
behind that step was that not every enterprise performing in-
formation security risk analysis would also necessarily oper-
ate an ISMS or document their assets in a structured fashion.
Furthermore, we wanted to capture the opinion of those who
worked in organizations not yet operating an ISMS as well.
This design decision ultimately resulted in fragmented re-
sponses with different answer counts for individual question
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Figure 6: Survey structure and number of responses for each query path
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ITIL
BSI IT Baseline Methodology
Other
None
Yes, we operate 
a certified ISMS
12 %
Yes, we operate 
a non-certified ISMS
27 %
No, but we plan 
to implement an ISMS
23 %
No, and we do not 
plan to implement an ISMS
27 %
I do not know
12 %
0 2,5 5 7,5 10
ISMS established or planned No ISMS planned
0 2,25 4,5 6,75 9
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Customer demands
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Regulatory demands
1
Figure 7: ISMS adoption and motivation (푁 = 26)
blocks. Figure 6 shows the overall survey structure and the
number of responses for each primary or alternative query
path (numbers in diamond shapes at transitions between query
blocks). Note that 38 respondents canceled the survey be-
fore completing the first question block and another respon-
dent did so during the risk identification block. Thus, the
reduced total number of responses between respective ques-
tion blocks. Of the 26 responses 13 answered all questions
in the main path of which seven in addition answered the
optional block concerning security goals, requirements and
controls.
5.2. Information Security Management System
Adoption
Within o r study populationwere 10 companies that have
already established an ISMS of which 3 achieved a corre-
sponding certification. Another 6 companies were planning
to implement an ISMS. Figure 7 shows these results and
the stated motivation for doing so. The two most common
drivers for implementing an ISMS were customer and regu-
latory demands, a view also shared by those who refrained
from operating an ISMS.
5.3. Methods and Documentation Artifacts
Considered for Risk Analysis in ISM (RQ1)
While not all participants disclosed the ISRM method-
ologies used in their organization, we identified ISO 27005
(5 companies), BSI IT Baseline Protection Methodology (4
companies) and CRISAM1 (4 companies) to be the most
commonly applied methods. Discipline regarding the reg-
ular execution of risk management cycles (as required by all
of these standards) is not satisfactory. Although ten com-
panies (38%) had established an ISMS and should thus reg-
ularly conduct risk management, only six (23%) performed
this activities at least on an annual basis. Half of the partici-
pating companies do not regularly perform risk management
activities or with two or more years in between. Figure 8
shows which events trigger additional risk management cy-
cles. Reported security incidents or vulnerabilities are con-
sidered by almost every enterprise operating an ISMS towar-
rant an unscheduled re-assessment of information security
risks. Furthermore, actual attacks on IT infrastructure as
well as internal or external audits commonly lead to addi-
tional risk management activities. Interestingly, only 4 en-
1CRISAM is a popular GRC toolsuite in the DACH region. It provides
its own best-practice approaches for various ISRM tasks and in addition
supports common information security standards.
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Additional Security Qualification
31 %
Meta Data
VALUE (Average) Deviation min max
Participants 26
Completed 23
First Participant 18.09.17 14:41
Last participant 09.08.19 06:49
Time [min] 18,79 8,75 5,37 50,36
Participants
VALUE (Average) Deviation min max
Organizational 
Role
CIO 5
CISO 3
CTO 0
Head of IT Department 4
Security Manager 5
Security Analyst 1
Security Engineer 1
Security Consultant 2
Risk Manager 3
Quality Manager 3
Compliance Manager 0
Software/Systems/Network Engineer 3
Software/Systems/Network Architect 4
Software Developer 3
Other 2 Product Manager
Personal 
Qualifications
CISM 2
CISP 4
CEH 0
CCNP 1
CISA 0
U Deg CS 7
U Deg SM 3
U Deg Busi 7
Other 5 DI (FH) Elektrotechnik, MA Arts in Business, PhD in Physics, 
ISO 27001 internal auditor
[None] 6
InfSec Experience 6,70 4,17 1,00 18,00
Companies
VALUE
Industry Type Information Technology 8
Services 2
Manufacturing 7
Retail 0
Finance and Insurance 3
Public Administration 0
Other 6 Automation Software, Different, Utility
Size < 10 employees 4
10 - 50 employees 1
50 - 250 employees 11
> 250 employees 10
Country Germany 2
Austria 23
Switzerland 1
Liechtenstein 0
Other EU Country 0
Non EU Country 0
ICT Standards ISO 27K 11
COBIT 1
ITIL 8
ValIT 0
BSI IT Baseline 7
Other 5 Energy, Pharma
[NONE] 6
Information Security Management
VALUE alt Total
Operate ISMS? I do not know 3
No, and we do not  
plan to implement an ISMS
7
No, but we plan  
to implement an ISMS
6
Yes, we operate  
a non-certified ISMS
7
Yes, we operate  
a certified ISMS
3
Comments Implementing Security for IIOT and IOT device deployment out of a cloud platform
Most important 
driver
Higher degree of information security 3 0 3
Customer demands 6 3 9
Shareholder demands 1 0 1
Regulatory demands 6 4 10
[NOT SPECIFIED] 10 19 3
Comments
ISRM ISO 27005 5 3 8
ISO 31000 1 0 1
BSI IT Baseline Protection Methodology4 3 7
 NIST SP 800 30 0 1 1
CRAMM 0 0 0
OCTAVE 0 0 0
AS/NZS 4360 0 0 0
CRISAM 4 0 4
Other 2 to be defined, non
RM Cycle Never 8
At least twice a year 3
At least once a year 3
At least once every two years 2
Occasionally (more than two years between cycles)3
[NOT SPECIFIED] 7
RM Trigger Events Change of the operational Environment (Process, IT Infrastructure, …)4
Reported Security Incident or vulnerability (external)9
Attack of IT infrastructure, applications or services (internal)6
Internal Audit 6
External Audit 6
Penetration Tests 1 Penetrations Tests
Participants - condensed
CxO 8 30,77 %
Head of IT Department 4 15,38 %
Dedicated Security Role 9 34,62 %
Software Development 10 38,46 %
Risk Manager 3 11,54 %
Quality Manager 3 11,54 %
Product Manager 2 7,69 %
Additional Security Qualification 8
NONE 18
STEM 8
System 
Mgmt.
4
Business 8
NONE 6
Roles
Product Manager
5 %
Quality Manager
8 %
Risk Manager
8 %
Software Development
26 %
Dedicated Security Role
23 %
Head of IT Department
10 %CxO21 %
Qualifications
NONE
23 %
Business
31 %
System 
Mgmt.
15 %
STEM
31 %
Other
23 %
Finance and Insurance
12 %
Manufacturing
27 %
Services
8 %
Information Technology
31 %
> 250 employees
38 %
50 - 250 employees
42 %
10 - 50 employees
4 %
< 10 employees
15 %
0 3 6 9 12
Asset Management
Perform Asset DocumentationYES 16
NO 7
N/A 3
Asset documentation is orchestrated in a centralized mannerApplies fully 4
Applies mostly 7
Applies to some extent 5
Does not apply 1
Do not know 1
N/A 8
We keep records of all individual assetsApplies f lly 3
Applies mostly 2
Applies to some extent 8
Does not apply 1
Do not know 2
N/A 10
Considered Assets (actual)
Yes No N/A
Business Processes 13 6 7
Organizational Units 6 13 7
Suppliers 6 13 7
Stakeholders 5 14 7
IT Services 14 5 7
Applications 14 5 7
Cloud Services (external) 5 14 7
Server Hardware 15 4 7
Workstations 13 6 7
POI/POS Terminals 5 14 7
Network Infrastructure 15 4 7
Premises 6 13 7
Rooms 8 11 7
Other Software Design
NONE 1 18 7
Considered Assets (hypothetical)
Yes No N/A
Business Processes 3 4 19
Organizational Units 1 6 19
Suppliers 1 6 19
Stakeholders 0 7 19
IT Services 4 3 19
Applications 3 4 19
Cloud Services (external) 3 4 19
Server Hardware 3 4 19
Workstations 3 4 19
POI/POS Terminals 1 6 19
Network Infrastructure 3 4 19
Premises 1 6 19
Rooms 1 6 19
Other
Asset Documentation Tools (hypothetical)
Yes No N/A
ISO 27k
COBIT
ITIL
BSI IT Baseline Methodology
Other
None
Yes, we operate 
a certified ISMS
12 %
Yes, we operate 
a non-certified ISMS
27 %
No, but we plan 
to implement an ISMS
23 %
No, and we do not 
plan to implement an ISMS
27 %
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1
Figure 8: Events triggering additional risk management cycles
(푁 = 26)
Table 6
Assets documented and used for information security risk as-
sessment activities (푁 = 16)
Types of Assets Considered by
Network Infrastructure, Server hardware 94%
IT Services, Applications 88%
Workstations, Business Processes 81%
Rooms 50%
Organizational Units, Suppliers, Premises 38%
Stakeholders, Cloud Services (external),
POI/POS Terminals
31%
Other: Software Design 6%
not disclosed 6%
terprises stated that changes of the operational environment
trigger a risk management cycle (cf. ISO 27001: “The orga-
nization shall perform information security risk assessment
at planned intervals or when significant changes are pro-
posed to occur,[..]”). Regarding applied methods and cor-
responding documentation artifacts we identified a diverse
overall picture.
Asset Documentation
Table 6 shows the types of assets that organizations con-
ducting ISRM activities document and use. Note that only
16 organizations stated that they document assets at all. It
can be observed that technical aspects (e.g., hardware, ap-
plications) are emphasized over organizational aspects (e.g.,
stakeholders, suppliers).
Concerning the practical implementation of the asset doc-
umentation process, we could observe that this crucial ac-
tivity is in most cases centralized (69% of responses stated
that this activity is performed fully or mostly in a centralized
manner). However, only 19% of responses stated that they
keep records of all individual assets, most others only keep-
ing records of individual assets for certain groups. A similar
picture can be observed for the timeliness of the available as-
set documentation, where only 19% of the enterprises stated
that their asset documentation is always up-to-date. This
Table 7
Methods and practices applied for the identification of infor-
mation security risks (푁 = 17)
Risk Identification Methods Applied by
Checklists 53%
Brainstorming 41%
FMEA, CRISAM 18%
CCA, ISRAM 12%
SWIFT, PHA, RAM 6%
not disclosed 12%
clearly relates to the still improvable automation of asset
documentation and discovery (88% of companies stated that
asset documentation is a mostly manual task) and the domi-
nating practice of less-than-annual risk management cycles.
Risk Identification
Information security risk identification is primarily per-
formed in a manual fashion with only 31% of organizations
stating that they at least partially automated some of these
activities. Only one organization identifies relevant security
risks in a timely fashion, all others stating at least some defi-
ciencies. In addition, a general lack of suitable internal pro-
cesses to share relevant security information can be derived
from the survey responses. Inter-organizational exchange of
security information is generally not perceived as beneficial.
The most commonly applied risk identification methods
are rather informal ones such as the use of checklists and
brainstormings (cf. Table 7). More demanding approaches
(with regard to methodological complexity, dedicated stake-
holder expertise and documentation requirements) are spar-
ingly used in context of ISM. Seven companies applied amix
of (2 to 5) risk identification technique compared to 5 com-
panies relying on a singular method to identify information
security risks.
Risk Estimation, Evaluation and Treatment
The most common approach to estimate identified in-
formation security risks is to rely on qualitative ratings of
involved stakeholders (46% of responding companies, ad-
ditional 23% use semi-quantitative approaches). Only one
organization (large internationally operating enterprise, us-
ing COBIT) performs quantitative risk estimation. Other re-
sponses did not disclose their risk estimation approach. De-
pendencies between assets are regularly considered during
risk identification (only two companies ignore them) as are
potential dependencies between security risks (ignored by
three companies). Risk estimation on the other hand has a
tendency to not incorporate estimated likelihood or proba-
bility of related risks. Furthermore, companies do not use
automation techniques to perform risk estimation and solely
rely on manual practices.
Regarding methods used for risk estimation, we see a
similar picture to risk identification. The majority of organi-
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Table 8
Methods applied for risk prioritization (푁 = 16)
Prioritization Applied by
Risk Matrix 38%
Risk Priority Number 38%
Relative Risk Ranking 31%
not disclosed 13%
Table 9
Methods applied for risk treatment decision (푁 = 16)
Decision Applied by
Cost-benefit analysis 38%
Management Decision 38%
Risk acceptance criteria 25%
not disclosed 19%
zations relies on more informal methods like brainstorming
and structured approaches such as FMEA. Only enterprises
operating in strictly regulated domains (e.g. healthcare, util-
ity) apply more formal risk estimation approaches like FTA,
CCA and PHA. Tables 8 and 9 show the techniques used to
prioritize estimated risks and to decide whether risks require
treatment at all. Interestingly, dedicated management deci-
sions and cost-benefit analysis aremore commonly used than
the application of risk acceptance criteria putting greater ef-
fort on individual decision processes.
Security Requirements and Controls
The final question block concerning the documentation
of security requirements and controls was optional and 10
of 26 responses opted for disclosing their current practices.
Figure 9 shows the corresponding results. The majority of
enterprises define and document security goals, requirements
or controls, with 70% following a hierarchical documenta-
tion approach distinguishing at least to some extent between
goals, requirements and controls. Documentation is com-
monly not centralized and re-evaluation of security goals,
requirements and controls is only performed on a regular ba-
sis by companies operating an ISMS.Automation techniques
in elicitation as well as monitoring of security controls are
currently not applied.
The documented attributes and aspects of information
security goals, requirements and controls show a high re-
liance on textual descriptions (cf. Table 10). While ad-
dressed risks are commonly documented, most respondents
refrain from documenting any other rational for security con-
trols or even relating them with the assets they are supposed
to protect. Changes of security controls themselves or their
fulfillment are of lesser concern as is the dedicated documen-
tation of audit procedures or stakeholder responsibilities.
Table 10
Attributes and aspects documented for security goals, require-
ments and controls (푁 = 10)
Attribute Documented by
Description 90%
Addressed Risks 50%
Rationale 30%
Associated Assets 20%
History of Changes of the Degree of Ful-
fillment
20%
History of Changes (excl. Degree of Ful-
fillment)
20%
Audit Procedures 10%
Responsible, Accountable, Consulted,
Informed (RACI) Stakeholders or Orga-
nizational Units
10%
not disclosed 20%
5.4. Stakeholder Involvement and Collaboration
Patterns (RQ2)
In order to investigate stakeholder involvement we asked
participants which roles were involved in ISRM activities
and how many people contributed to each step. Table 11
shows how often each role has been declared to be involved
in activities of risk identification, risk estimation and the
documentation of security requirements and controls. Re-
sponses show that top-management roles (CIO, CISO and to
a lesser extent CTO) are generally involved in all activities,
and that the instantiation of dedicated security and risk man-
agement roles is common practice. Furthermore we identi-
fied quite strong involvement of software development roles.
The second part of Table 11 shows the amount of stakehold-
ers involved in each activity. Although it might be expected
that larger organizations with established ISMS invest more
manpower in ISRM activities, responses show that this is
not universally true. The companies stating that more than
25 people are involved in any of these actions are all large en-
terprises with more than 250 employees, already operating
an ISMS and working in heavily regulated domains (finance
and healthcare). In general, responses show a tendency to-
wards smaller teams performing ISRM activities, commonly
less than 10 people strong even among larger companies.
The question of how stakeholders collaborate in these ac-
tivities can be conducted in part from previously discussed
applied methods. To get a fuller picture, however, we asked
dedicated questions regarding their mode of collaboration
and how this is technically realized. Table 12 presents the
responses to these questions (e.g., RI009 “How is the collab-
oration between stakeholders for information security risk
identification designed and which tools are used to document
identified risks in your organization?”). We can directly in-
fer a heavy emphasis on direct stakeholder interaction dur-
ing risk identification and risk estimation, whereas dedicated
risk management or ISMS tools play a rather minor role.
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Don't know 0
Not disclosed 0
N/A 16
We distinguish between security goals, requirements and controls.Appli s fully 1
Applies mostly 2
Applies to some extent 4
Does not apply 3
Don't know 0
Not disclosed 0
N/A 16
Documentation of security goals, requirements and controls is orchestrated in a centralized manner.Applies fully 2
Applies mostly 0
Applies to some extent 3
Does not apply 5
Don't know 0
Not disclosed 0
N/A 16
Security goals, requirements and controls are evaluated with regard to their degree of fulfillment on a regular basis.Applies fully 0
Applies mostly 2
Applies to some extent 4
Does not apply 4
Don't know 0
Not disclosed 0
N/A 0
The elicitation of security controls is performed automatically.Applies fully 0
Applies mostly 0
Applies to some extent 1
Does not apply 9
Don't know 0
Not disclosed 0
N/A 16
The fulfillment of security controls is automatically evaluated.Applies fully 0
Applies mostly 0
Applies to some extent 2
Does not apply 7
Don't know 0
Not disclosed 1
N/A 16
We do NOT 
define or 
document security 
goals, 
requirements or 
controls.
Does not apply
30 %
Applies to some extent
50 %
Applies mostly
10 %Applies fully10 %
We 
distinguish 
between security 
goals, 
requirements 
and controls.
Does not apply
30 %
Applies to some extent
40 %
Applies mostly
20 %
Applies fully
10 %
Documentation 
of security goals, 
requirements and 
controls is 
orchestrated in a 
centralized 
manner.
Does not apply
50 %
Applies to some extent
30 %
Applies fully
20 %
Security 
goals, 
requirements and 
controls are evaluated 
with regard to their 
degree of fulfillment 
on a regular 
basis.Does not apply
40 %
Applies to some extent
40 %
Applies mostly
20 %
The 
elicitation of 
security controls is 
performed 
automatically.
Does not apply
90 %
Applies to some extent
10 %
The 
fulfillment of 
security controls is 
automatically 
evaluated.
Not disclosed
10 %
Does not apply
70 %
Applies to some extent
20 %
Challenges in Documentation of Security Requirements 
• Orchestrating their documentation

• Ensuring correct state

• CEO support
Considered Attributes (actual)
Yes No N/A
Description 8 1 17
Rationale 3 6 17
Current Degree of Fulfillment 3 6 17
History of Changes of the Degree of Fulfillment2 7 17
Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, Informed (RACI) Stakeholders or Organizational Units1 8 17
Audit Procedures 1 8 17
Adressed Risks 5 4 17
Associated Assets 2 7 17
History of Changes (excl. Degree of Fulfillment)2 7 17
Other
NONE 1 8 17
Stakeholder Involvement
Risk Identification Risk Estimation Security Requirements
CIO 7 5 3
CISO 7 4 2
CTO 2 2 1
Head of IT Department 6 4 4
Security Manager 5 4 2
Security Analyst 4 4 2
Security Engineer 0 0 0
Security Consultant 3 1 0
Risk Manager 7 6 3
Quality Manager 4 1 2
Compliance Manager 3 2 0
Software/Systems/Network Engineer 5 3 2
Software/Systems/Network Architect 5 4 4
Software Developer 5 4 3
Other Process Owner CEO
NOT DISCLOSED 2 2 0
N/A 9 11 17
Stakeholder Involvement (grouped)
Risk Identification Risk Estimation Security Requirements
CxO 13 76 % 9 56 % 6 67 %
Head of IT Department 6 35 % 4 25 % 4 44 %
Dedicated Security Role 9 53 % 8 50 % 2 22 %
Risk Manager 7 41 % 6 38 % 3 33 %
Quality Manager 4 24 % 1 6 % 2 22 %
Compliance Manager 3 18 % 2 13 % 0 0 %
Software Development 9 53 % 7 44 % 5 56 %
Other Process Owner CEO
NOT DISCLOSED 2 12 % 2 13 % 0 0 %
N= 17 16 9
Stakeholder Involvement (Participants)
Risk Identification Risk Estimation Security Requirements
< 5 employees 5 29 % 6 38 % 6 67 %
5 - 10 employees 5 29 % 3 19 % 1 11 %
10 - 25 employees 2 12 % 1 6 % 1 11 %
> 25 employees 3 18 % 2 13 % 0 0 %
NOT DISCLOSED 2 12 % 4 25 % 1 11 %
N= 17 16 9
Stakeholder Collaboration
Risk Identification Risk Estimation Security Requirements
Email 12 71 % 11 69 % 0 %
Chat 3 18 % 5 31 % 0 %
Forum 1 6 % 2 13 % 0 %
Telephone 9 53 % 8 50 % 0 %
Face-to-Face Meetings 13 76 % 11 69 % 0 %
Threat Intelligence Sharing Platform1 6 % 0 0 % 0 %
Task Management System 2 12 % 1 6 % 0 %
Risk Management Tool 4 24 % 4 25 % 0 %
ISMS Tool 2 12 % 0 0 % 0 %
Governance, Risk Management and Compliance (GRC) Tool0 0 % 0 0 % 0 %
Document Management System3 18 % 2 13 % 0 %
Wiki 6 35 % 4 25 % 0 %
Reports 3 18 % 3 19 % 0 %
Spreadsheets 5 29 % 3 19 % 0 %
Other EAM Tool CRISAM
NOT DISCLOSED 0 0 % 0 0 % 0 %
N= 17 16 9
Considered Information Sources (hypothetical)
Yes No N/A
Standards 3 2 21
Industry Best Practices 1 4 21
Security Control Catalogues 2 3 21
Software Tools 2 3 21
Security Consultants 3 2 21
Other
NONE 2 3 21
Considered Information Sources (actual)
Yes No N/A
Standards 6 3 17
Industry Best Practices 5 4 17
Security Control Catalogues 0 9 17
Software Tools 4 5 17
Security Consultants 3 6 17
Other
NONE 2 7 17
Used SER Documentation Tools (actual)
Yes No N/A
Reports 6 3 17
Spreadsheets 5 4 17
Wiki 3 6 17
Document Management System 3 6 17
Risk Management Tool 1 8 17
ISMS Tool 0 9 17
Governance, Risk Management and Compliance (GRC) Tool0 9 17
Other EAM-Tool
NONE 0 9 17
 3
Figure 9: State of information security requirements and control practices (푁 = 10)
5.5. Additional Data Sources and Tools used in
Risk Analysis (RQ3)
Relevant information for ISRMactivities can be retrieved
from different data sources and tools. We investigated which
data sources are commonly used and which tools enterprises
favor. While the previous section emphasized tools used as
means to collaborate, this section emphasizes data sources
and tools providing input for individual activities and those
being used to store respective results and provide them for
subsequent activities.
Considering that the documentation of relevant assets is
the vital very first step to conduct a high-quality risk anal-
ysis we investigated the tools that are used by enterprises
for that activity. Responses indicate that general-purpose
documentation tools such as spreadsheets or schematic di-
agrams and charts are more commonly used than dedicated
information security tools (cf. Table 13). Specialized docu-
mentation andmodeling software like CMDBs or EAM tools
are typically used in conjunction with general purpose docu-
mentation tools. On average an enterprise uses 2.9 (푠 = 1.2)
different tool types to document its assets.
Tables 14 and 15 list external and internal information
sources used during risk identification. The column Ranking
relates to how often each information source has been named
as being one of the three most important information sources
for a company. On average, each company used 5.2 (푠 = 2.0)
external and 4.6 (푠 = 2.4) internal data sources during risk
identification. Enterprises heavily rely on vendor-specific
advisories and vulnerability databases. Newspapers, wikis
and exploit database, although regularly used, are of lesser
importance in risk identification processes. Security poli-
cies, incident management as well as (penetration) test re-
ports are the most relevant internal information sources dur-
ing risk identification. Checklists and security reviews on
the other hand are generally considered to be of lesser im-
portance.
The most viable information source for information se-
curity requirements and controls are standards and industry
best practices (both used by two-thirds of responding compa-
nies). Dedicated software tools and the involvement of exter-
nal security consultants are other appliedmethods to identify
security controls as means of reducing information security
risks. The most common tool to document them are writ-
ten reports and spreadsheets, both a rather static medium.
Dedicated document management systems or wikis are of
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Table 11
Stakeholder participation in ISRM activities
Risk Identification Risk Estimation Security Controls
Involved Roles
CxO 76% 56% 67%
Head of IT Department 35% 25% 4%
Dedicated Security Role 53% 50% 20%
Risk Manager 41% 38% 30%
Quality Manager 24% 6% 20%
Compliance Manager 18% 13% 0%
Software Development 53% 44% 50%
Other — Process Owner (1) CEO (1)
not disclosed 12% 13% 10%
Involved Staff
< 5 employees 29% 38% 6%
5 - 10 employees 29% 19% 10%
10 - 25 employees 12% 6% 10%
> 25 employees 18% 13% 0%
not disclosed 12% 25% 20%
푁 = 17 푁 = 16 푁 = 10
Table 12
Stakeholder collaboration in ISRM activities
Collaboration Patterns Risk Identification Risk Estimation
Direct
Email 71% 69%
Chat 18% 31%
Forum 6% 13%
Telephone 53% 50%
Face-to-Face Meetings 76% 69%
Tool-based
Threat Intelligence Sharing Platform 6% 0%
Task Management System 12% 6%
Risk Management Tool 24% 31%
ISMS Tool 12% 0%
Via Shared
Documents
Document Management System 18% 13%
Wiki 35% 25%
Reports 24% 19%
Spreadsheets 29% 19%
not disclosed 12% 13%
푁 = 17 푁 = 16
less concern. Only one organization responded that it uses
a dedicated risk management tool to document security re-
quirements and controls.
5.6. Notable Differences between Companies with
and without ISMS
Due to the small sample we refrained from quantitative
statistic analysis (푁ISMS established = 10, 푁ISMS planned = 6)of differences between those groups. Instead we conducted a
qualitative analysis and interpretation of notable differences
in responses. Furthermore, we present results from respon-
dents whose organizations did not plan to establish an ISMS
or which did not perform certain activities (e.g., enterprises
planning to implement an ISMS but not conducting asset
documentation yet). Those respondents were guided through
the alternate survey path where their perception and general
knowledge of ISRM activities was captured.
In general we observed that ISRM practices are also per-
formed by organizations not committed to the implementa-
tion of an ISMS. Of the seven responses that did not plan
to establish an ISMS, three did in fact already document as-
sets, perform risk analysis and document security require-
ments and controls. Those, however, showed a significant
lower maturity in ISRM practices with less stakeholder in-
volvement and overall smaller scope and documentation dis-
cipline.
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Table 13
Tools used to document assets (푁 = 16)
Asset Documentation Tools Used by
Spreadsheets 50%
Configuration Management Database (CMDB) 44%
Enterprise Architecture Modeling (EAM),
Schematic diagrams/charts
38%
ISMS Tool, ISRM Tool 25%
not disclosed 25%
Table 14
External information sources used during risk identification
(푁 = 17)
External Information Source Used by Ranking
Newspapers 59% LOW
Wikis 47% LOW
Blogs 35% LOW
Mailinglists 65% MEDIUM
Social Media 29% LOW
Exploit Database 59% LOW
Vulnerability Database 65% HIGH
Vendor-specific Advisories 71% HIGH
Threat Intelligence Sharing Plat-
forms
29% LOW
Special Interest Groups 29% LOW
not disclosed 6%
Table 15
Internal information sources used during risk identification
(푁 = 17)
Internal Information Source Used by Ranking
Security Policy 41% HIGH
Checklists 47% LOW
Best Practices 47% MEDIUM
Issue Tracker 59% MEDIUM
Incident Management 53% HIGH
Internal (Security) Reviews 41% LOW
Audit Protocols 35% MEDIUM
(Penetration) Test Reports 53% HIGH
Security Monitoring Tools 53% MEDIUM
not disclosed 0%
Organizations who did not document their assets had a
slightly different view of what constitutes as a relevant as-
set for ISRM activities. Whereas organizational units, sup-
pliers and stakeholders were considered relevant assets by a
third of organizations performing this step (cf. Table 6), they
were generally not considered by organizations not perform-
ing this practice. Another distinguishing fact was the usage
of asset documentation tools. Organizations not document-
ing assets would favor the use of dedicated documentation
tools (e.g., EAM Tool, CMDBs) and not use spreadsheets or
schematic diagrams at all. Reality, however, was that actual
asset documentation practices primarily relied on the use of
these tool types (cf. Section 5.3).
Respondents from companies which do not perform cer-
tain ISRM practices or are still in the process of planning an
ISMS introduction showed a generally good knowledge of
availablemethods, tools and corresponding standards. Ques-
tions targeting preferred ISRMpractices showed a somewhat
idealistic view that deviates from actual practice, preferring
perceived one-stop solutions (e.g., ISRM or dedicated mod-
eling tools) over those that are predominantly employed in
practice.
5.7. Perceived Challenges
Although not the focal point of our investigation, we did
ask participants concerning current challenges in informa-
tion security risk assessment. As initially expected responses
to these open questions were sparse but since all of them
were given from respondents who were actively involved in
their organization’s ISMS operation we deem them to be
still of value for our overarching research objectives. Re-
occurring themes in mentioned challenges were (1) insuffi-
cient management support and availability of stakeholders,
(2) effort required for formal establishment of ISRM pro-
cesses, and (3) ensuring that required information is up-to-
date. Apart from (1), these challenges clearly relate to our
survey results regarding applied, rather informal ISRMprac-
tices and the neglectable usage of automation facilities or
dedicated tools. The lack of top-level management support
was mentioned by two respondents from smaller companies
(less than 25 employees) operating an ISMS.
6. Discussion
The conducted study investigated ISRMpractices applied
in larger organization-wide information securitymanagement
settingswith an emphasis on organizations operating or plan-
ning to introduce an ISMS. We constructed a conceptual
model to explore the status quo of risk management activ-
ities, involved stakeholders, their collaboration patterns as
well as utilized tools and data sources. Our analysis used
data provided by 26 participants who shared information per-
taining aspects of our conceptual model. In this section, we
will discuss the results, their potential implications with re-
gard to our research objectives and potential limitations of
our research.
6.1. Interpretation of Results
In general our respondents closely followed respective
standards and best practiceswhen choosingmethods and pro-
viding documentation artifacts within their ISRM activities.
Starting with the first step, the documentation of assets, re-
sults show that relevant aspects and groups of assets are well
represented in general. However, a greater emphasis on purely
technical aspects, especially within small or medium sized
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enterprises is present. This further indicates that more com-
plex aspects in information security risk management such
as securing the availability of critical organizational knowl-
edge are currently underrepresented. The preferred use of
general purpose documentation tools such as spreadsheets
or diagrams in favor of tools dedicated to manage asset in-
ventories has multiple implications. It leads to higher man-
ual involvement and introduces potential errors due to non-
timely updates, even when asset inventories are mostly man-
aged in a centralized fashion. Furthermore, the granularity
and quality of asset catalogs can be improved by amore thor-
ough consideration of individual assets instead of groups of
assets and the documentation of potential dependencies be-
tween assets.
A similar reliance onmanual processeswas found through-
out all subsequent risk assessment activities. The amount
of involved stakeholders and the heterogeneity of involved
business roles would ideally require the use of focused prac-
tices and close monitoring which was not the case. Instead
neither applied risk assessment methods nor means of stake-
holder collaboration can be considered satisfactory in terms
of repeatability and overall output quality. Our results point
to the typical risk identification practice involving face-to-
face meetings supplemented by telephone calls and emails
between stakeholders who rely on brainstorming techniques
and checklists to identify information security risks. Ac-
cordingly, these practices limit the traceability and docu-
mentation of decisions which might result in a lack of trans-
parency. That is not only far from utilizing readily avail-
able more structured or even formal approaches, but also
burdens involved stakeholders with scheduling issues for re-
quired meetings or results in non-availability of key stake-
holders (cf. Section 5.7). The primarily qualitative risk es-
timation approaches applied by respondents bear the same
pitfalls especially when paired with predominantly unstruc-
tured documentation of the results of performed ISRM ac-
tivities. Overall, our results suggest that ISRM practices are
conducted in a fashion that strongly impedes their reliability
– especially when key personell is replaced or otherwise not
available.
Considering the heterogeneity of involved stakeholders
it is not surprising that a diverse set of information sources
are used during ISRMactivities as well. Information sources
perceived as more important typically provide data points
that are directly applicable to ISRMactivities such as vendor-
specific advisories which can easily be distilled to retrieve
the assets being subject to a certain vulnerability and addi-
tionally provide a preemptive risk analysis. Still, less struc-
tured information sources (e.g., newspaper articles, mailing
lists, wikis) are commonly used by stakeholders. Reliably
analyzing these resources for relevant information is an elab-
orate task that would not only involve extensive scanning of
unstructured material but in addition require stakeholders to
convey retrieved information to their organizational setting
as well. Moreover, research on shadow threat intelligence
showed that the informal use of less structured information
might result in several risks like limited traceability, infor-
mation loss or waste of resources (Sauerwein et al., 2018).
This situation might be improved through the introduction of
NLP-supported threat intelligence (sharing) platforms that
provide relevant information tailored to the specific infor-
mation security needs of an organization and the respective
demands of involved stakeholders.
The definition, documentation and subsequent manage-
ment of security requirements and controls leaves room for
improvement as well. Especially technical security controls
could favor more automation and shorter re-assessment cy-
cles regarding the review of their fulfillment. Various solu-
tions are available to automatically monitor the fulfillment
of certain security controls and integrating them in organi-
zational ISRM practices would greatly benefit the timeliness
of available compliance information. Especially in light of
the thorough documentation practices applied for security
controls – they are commonly documented with links to ad-
dressed risks – this could generally improve other ISRM ac-
tivities as well and could potentially lead to a more timely
re-evaluation of information security risks.
6.2. FAIR Guidelines
Concerning potential future ISRM research and frame-
work development in organizational ISRM and ISMSs we
propose the following guidelines for better applicability of
developed solutions in light of the reported status quo:
•F avor structured over strictly formal approaches.
ISRM practices are currently dominated by informal
approaches. A direct leap to more demanding formal
practices – especially for risk analysis in general orga-
nizational settings – will not be widely adopted. Re-
search should thus focus on providing structured ap-
proaches with easy-to-follow guidelines and clear in-
structions for result documentation.
•A ddress heterogeneous stakeholder landscape. In-
formation security initiatives heavily rely on inclusion
and collaboration of different stakeholders (security
experts, process owners, etc.) from various domains.
Any successful approach will have to proactively ad-
dress collaboration patterns and potential issues due to
differences in stakeholder knowledge and expertise.
•I ncorporate established documentation practices.
Independent of applied practices and standards, ISRM
activities utilize various information sources and stor-
age facilities, in many cases relying on general pur-
pose documentation tools. Enterpriseswill not be forced
to abandon these established documentation practices
and new approaches should aim at seamless integra-
tion of what is present and working.
•R espect scarceness of resources. Operating an ISMS
is a costly business endeavor due to high reliance on
manual decision processes and overall lack of automa-
tion. The complex enterprise spanning scope thus re-
quires provision of technical, financial and human re-
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sources often outside an enterprises’ dedicated secu-
rity organization. Riskmanagement approaches should
thus provide a transparent cost-benefit model to show
that scarce resources are used beneficially and that au-
tomation facilities are effectively implemented.
These guidelines were derived from the previously presented
interpretation of results and cover themajor reoccurring themes
found in our survey responses. We argue that by following
our proposed guidelines, researchers can develop more di-
rectly applicable ISRM solutions that substantially improve
the current state of practice without overburdening enter-
prises with additional efforts. While the process discipline
and overall maturity of ISM is expected to raise in the com-
ing years, solutions adhering our guidelines should aid or-
ganizational transitions until formal approaches are becom-
ing the norm as security experts have been advocating for
decades.
6.3. Implications
Our results provide researchers with a more comprehen-
sive picture of currently applied ISRM practices in organi-
zations. Since our investigation emphasized organization-
wide practices applied within ISMSs we explored what tech-
niques enterprises use in heterogeneous intra-organizational
settings instead of secluded risk management activities per-
formed in specialized application domains. We provide new
insight into involved roles and collaboration patterns within
these activities including preferred tool usage and incorpo-
rated information sources.
We provide the basis for the development of ISRM prac-
tices that are less disruptive of the current organizational
practice and thus have a greater chance to be actually adopted
by enterprises. Furthermore, our proposed guidelines can
help researchers to successfully transfer available conceptual
tools or approaches to larger, practical, closer-to-life settings
for evaluation purposes and critical reflection of their own
works applicability.
Three common deficiencies in ISRMpracticeswere iden-
tified by Webb et al. (2014): (1) information security risk
identification is commonly perfunctory, (2) information se-
curity risks are commonly estimated with little reference to
the organization’s actual situation, and (3) information Se-
curity risk assessment is commonly performed on an inter-
mitted, non-historical basis. The general focus on technical
aspects in asset documentation practices as well as the in-
sufficient consideration of dependencies between assets and
risks shown by our results largely support deficiency 1. A
similar issue regarding proper identification and inventory
of information technology assets was stated in challenge 1
by Fenz et al. (2014). The organizational reality regarding
risk estimation as illustrated by our study responses high-
lights the general refusal of applying quantitative approaches
in favor of rather interpretative practices with high reliance
on stakeholders’ expertise and limited reproducibility of re-
sults. This compares to deficiency 2 by Webb et al. (2014)
and is partially captured by challenge 3 regarding failed pre-
dictions in risk in Fenz et al. (2014). In alignment with de-
ficiency 3 our responses support the notion of primarily in-
termitted non-historical risk assessments. This is obvious in
the malpractice of performing risk management activities ir-
regularly with two ormore years in between cycles. Which is
made even worse by manual and non-formal risk assessment
methods generally used in practice and a heavy reliance on
general purpose documentation tools with questionable abil-
ities to reliably portrait historical developments to involved
stakeholders.
Regarding ISRM research in general, Wangen and Snek-
kenes (2013) constitute various challenges, repeatedly stat-
ing a common lack of empirical research and good data, es-
pecially concerning the validation and verification of exist-
ing methods. We argue that without a better alignment be-
tween proposed riskmanagement approaches and the current
industrial practice – as well as organizational capabilities –
this gap can not be sufficiently addressed on a broader scale.
Our survey design and results contribute a solid basis for fur-
ther empirical research and provides a viable starting point
to tailor academic efforts to a wider base of organizations.
Overall, with our contribution, we support researchers
with a solid picture of the current industrial practice and a re-
peatable survey instrument to periodically re-assess the sta-
tus quo. Additionally, the proposed guidelines should help
academic endeavors and information security practitioners
alike to develop applicable solutions for the iterative improve-
ment of current ISRM practices.
6.4. Limitations
Our survey has been developed in accordance with re-
spected best practice guidelines and we performed several
measures to control the validity of presented results as out-
lined in Section 4. However, there are still limitations present
that need further consideration.
Most notably, the number of responses that we received
and that could ultimately be used is limited, thus potentially
affecting the external validity of our findings. It is, however,
reasonably high for the performed qualitative analysis and
descriptive statistics presented in this work. A larger set of
responses would ultimately yield more reliable results and
allow the application of quantitative statistic analysis meth-
ods.
Currently, we do not have any means to establish the rep-
resentativeness of our study population since no reliable fig-
ures regarding ISRM or ISMS adoption in the DACH region
are available. This, naturally, restricts the generalizability of
our findings. We presume for example that the actual busi-
ness domain and corresponding regulatory demands influ-
ences applied ISRM practices and their actual implementa-
tion. Since only a fraction of responses belongs to these do-
mains we cannot derive any definitive conclusions. Medium
sized (50 - 250 employees) and large companies (> 250 em-
ployees) make up the majority of responses. This prohibits
us from generalizing our conclusions to smaller enterprises.
The qualitative data analysis applied to analyze responses
might pose a threat to the reliability of derived results. While
the data set was small enough to be processed in that fashion,
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the identification of patterns in responses is arguably a cre-
ative process and thus potentially influenced by expectations
and prior experiences of involved researchers. We mitigated
this threat by involving multiple researchers in data analysis.
The design of our survey instrument raises potential threats
to construct validity of our results. First, the online sur-
vey was aimed at a maximum duration of 20 minutes and
was thus comparably more extensive than other information
security surveys. This poses the risk of participants pre-
emptively aborting our survey or quickly ending it via ex-
tensive use of default options and ignoring non-mandatory
questions. Responses showed that participants commonly
required around 19 minutes to complete the survey and that
those who prematurely aborted the questionnaire did so dur-
ing early questions regarding demographics. We addition-
ally analyzed the timespan participants required for individ-
ual questions as well as the usage of default answer options.
From that we could not identify any tendency that later ques-
tionwere not as thoroughly considered and answered as early
ones. However, based on our results we plan to streamline
the survey instrument for future iterations by merging sev-
eral questions regarding stakeholder collaboration and tool
usage.
The second potential issue regarding the survey instru-
ment arises from ambiguities in applied terms and defini-
tions. We counteracted this largely by choosing the well-
established ISO 27k family of standards as referential ba-
sis and by providing additional clarifications and definitions
with each question. Furthermore, participants were given
ample opportunity to express deviations via commendatory
input blocks present in most questions. Together with the re-
sults of a conducted pilot survey and subsequent interviews
with pilot participants we are confident that the design of our
online questionnaire did not negatively influence the validity
of our research.
Finally, our decision to use the ISO 27k family of stan-
dards as referential basis of our survey instrument poses a
threat to the validity of our findings and has a potentially
negative influence the generalizability of our results. This
affects primarily participants not familiar with the ISO stan-
dards that are operating an ISMS based on conceptually dif-
ferent approaches such as the BSI IT Baseline Protection
Methodology (BSI, 2017) or the NIST RMF (NIST, 2018)
for example. These standards put a stronger emphasis on
documentation and classification of processed information
and utilized systems together with the provision of baseline
security controls to reach the desired level of information
security. Typical ISRM activities are thus not procedurally
represented in the same fashion as in the ISO 27k family of
standards which might confound the aforementioned group
of study participants. The received responses and comments
from participants – even those that aborted the study and
were subsequently discarded for analysis – did not provide
any indication that this has been an issue.
7. Summary and Future Work
We presented an exploratory survey concerning the sta-
tus quo of risk management practices in information secu-
rity. We based our investigation on a conceptual model ex-
ploring different aspects such as the applied ISRM method-
ology, patterns of stakeholder collaboration, utilized tools as
well as involved information sources and considered docu-
mentation artifacts. We identified that the current state of
practice in the DACH region has a strong emphasis on man-
ual data collection, direct stakeholder communication and
non-formal approaches for risk identification and estimation
as well as complex but unstructured decision processes. In
addition, our findings suggest that the use of general purpose
documentation tools is preferred over using dedicated risk
management or ISMS tools. Finally, we derived guidelines
for the development of ISRM frameworks better suiting the
current state of practice and thereby enhancing their chance
for contemporary industrial application.
Our own research in the area of continuous information
securitymanagement and the development of the correspond-
ingADAMANT framework already benefited from early find-
ings (Brunner et al., 2018, 2019) and we will continue to im-
prove our approach. Following our guidelines we will em-
phasize the integration of established documentation prac-
tices and investigate potential means to reduce efforts for
the introduction and operation of ISMSs using ADAMANT.
In addition, we are currently designing a study to empiri-
cally analyze the proposed guidelines and their potential im-
pact on stakeholder perception of ISRM approaches regard-
ing their usefulness, applicability and implementation effort.
Future research will additionally target small and medium-
sized enterprises, investigating different ISRM approaches
to establish and support smaller scale ISMSs.
Another important direction of future research will be
the iterative enhancement and replication of the presented
study. We thuswant to invite information security researchers
to join us in our effort to draw a more precise picture of the
current state of ISRM practices used by enterprises to man-
age information security – not only in the DACH region but
also on a global scale.
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Appendix
The following presentation of the survey instrument is content-complete and a faithful recreation of the online question-
naire used fÃĳr our research. It does not aim at accurately portraying the look-and-feel of the resulting webpages which is
hardly possible in print.
A. Survey Instrument: RiskFlows Exploratory Study (Online)
The RiskFlows explorative study investigates the current practice and shortcomings in information security risk manage-
ment workflows. The study is conducted by the <AUTHOR-AFFILIATION>. The findings will provide ample information
on viable approaches for novel risk-driven information security management workflows that will additionally address the
areas of risk treatment and monitoring.
Thank you for considering to participate in our study. If you work in the line of strategic or operational information
security (risk) management you are the prime candidate for this questionnaire. We will ask specifics about the current state
of affairs regarding information security management and risk assessment in your company.
All responses are stored anonymously, none of the responses will be connected to identifying information, the results will
be used for statistical purposes and will be reported only in aggregated form. The survey will take approximately 20 minutes
to complete.
A.1. General
This group contains general questions regarding your enterprise and your organizational role.
DE001: What is your organizational role?
(Multiple+)
□ Chief Information Officer
□ Chief Information Security Officer
□ Chief Technology Officer
□ Head of IT Department
□ Security Manager
□ Security Analyst
□ Security Engineer
□ Security Consultant
□ Risk Manager
□ Quality Manager
□ Compliance Manager
□ Software/Systems/Network Engineer
□ Software/Systems/Network Architect
□ Software Developer
Other: ________________________
DE002: Which of the following personal certifications and qualifications do you have?
(Multiple+)
□ CISM
□ CISSP
□ CEH
□ CCNP
□ CISA
□ University degree in Computer Science
□ University degree in Information Systems
□ University degree in Business or Economics
Other: ________________________
DE003: How many years of professional expierience in the area of information security do you have?
(Numeric)
DE004: What type of industry is your organization in?
(Single+)
◦ Information Technology
◦ Services
◦Manufacturing
◦ Retail
◦ Finance and Insurance
◦ Public Administration
Other: ________________________
DE005: What is the size of your organization?
(Single)
◦ < 10 employees
◦ 10 - 50 employees
◦ 50 - 250 employees
◦ > 250 employees
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DE006: Where is your organization located?
(Single*)
◦ Germany
◦ Austria
◦ Switzerland
◦ Liechtenstein
◦ Other EU Country
◦ Non EU Country
Subsidiaries in: ________________________________________________
DE007: Which ICT Standards and frameworks are (partially) implemented in your orgnization?
(Multiple+)
□ ISO/IEC 27000 family of Standards
□ COBIT
□ ITIL
□ ValIT
□ BSI Baseline Protection Methodology
Other: ________________________
A.2. Information Security Management
This short group of questions aims at understanding basic notions of information security management in your organiza-
tion. According to the international ISO 27000 standard an Information Security Management System (ISMS) "[...] consists
of the policies, procedures, guidelines, and associated resources and activities, collectively managed by an organization, in
the pursuit of protecting its information assets."
IM001: Do you operate an Information Security Management System?
(Single+)
◦ No, and we do not plan to implement an ISMS
◦ No, but we plan to implement an ISMS
◦ Yes, we operate a non-certified ISMS
◦ Yes, we operate a certified ISMS (please provide certifi-
cation information in the comment)
Comment: ________________________________________________
IM002: What is the most important driver for Information Security Management in your organization?
(Single+)
◦ Higher degree of information security
◦ Customer demands
◦ Shareholder demands
◦ Regulatory demands
Other: ________________________
IM003: Which Information Security Risk Management (ISRM) methodology does your organization apply?
(Multiple+)
□ ISO 27005
□ ISO 31000
□ BSI IT Baseline Protection Methodology
□ NIST SP 800 30
□ CRAMM
□ OCTAVE
□ AS/NZS 4360
□ CRISAM
Other: ________________________
IM004: How often does your organization conduct an information security risk management cycle?
(Single)
◦ Never
◦ At least twice a year
◦ At least once a year
◦ At least once every two years
◦ Occasionally (more than two years between cycles)
◦ No answer
IM005: Which events additionally trigger information security risk management activities in your organization?
(Multiple+)
□ Change of the operational Environment (Process, IT In-
frastructure, ...)
□ Reported Security Incident or vulnerability (external)
□ Attack of IT infrastructure, applications or services (in-
ternal)
□ Internal Audit
□ External Audit
Other: ________________________
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IM002alt: What do you consider the most important driver for Information Security Management?(Single+)
◦ Higher degree of information security
◦ Customer demands
◦ Shareholder demands
◦ Regulatory demands
Other: ________________________
IM003alt: Which Information Security Risk Management (ISRM) methodology do you know?(Multiple+)
□ ISO 27005
□ ISO 31000
□ BSI IT Baseline Protection Methodology
□ NIST SP 800 30
□ CRAMM
□ OCTAVE
□ AS/NZS 4360
□ CRISAM
Other: ________________________
A.3. Considered Assets
This group of questions asks specifics about the way your organization documents and manages assets relevant for infor-
mation security. An Asset is "[...] any tangible or intangible thing or characteristic that has value to an organization". ISO
27001 demands that all assets "[...] associated with information and information processing facilities shall be identified and
an inventory of these assets shall be drawn up and maintained."
Even if your organization does not operate an ISMS or does not perform Information Security Risk Management (ISRM),
you might keep records of relevant assets (such as IT services, IT infrastructure elements, data, business processes).
AS000: Do you document assets in your organization in any way, shape or form?
(Yes/No)
AS001: Rate the following statements with regard to the asset documentation
of your organization.
(Rating)
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Asset documentation is orchestrated in a centralized manner. ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
We keep records of all individual assets. ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Asset documentation is always up-to-date. ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
We document dependencies between assets. ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Asset discovery/documentation is performed automatically. ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
AS002: Which assets are considered for the ISMS and ISRM activities in your organization?
(Multiple+)
□ Business Processes
□ Organizational Units
□ Suppliers
□ Stakeholders
□ IT Services
□ Applications
□ Cloud Services (external)
□ Server Hardware
□Workstations
□ POI/POS Terminals
□ Network Infrastructure
□ Premises
□ Rooms
Other: ________________________
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AS003: Which tools do you use manage the considered assets in your organization?
(Multiple+)
□ Enterprise Architecture Management (EAM)
□ Configuration Management Database (CMDB)
□ ISMS Tool
□ ISRM Tool
□ Spreadsheets
□ Schematic diagrams/charts
Other: ________________________
AS002alt: Which assets would you consider relevant for ISMS and ISRM activities?(Multiple+)
□ Business Processes
□ Organizational Units
□ Suppliers
□ Stakeholders
□ IT Services
□ Applications
□ Cloud Services (external)
□ Server Hardware
□Workstations
□ POI/POS Terminals
□ Network Infrastructure
□ Premises
□ Rooms
Other: ________________________
AS003alt: How would you prefer to manage considered assets?(Multiple+)
□ Enterprise Architecture Management (EAM)
□ Configuration Management Database (CMDB)
□ ISMS Tool
□ ISRM Tool
□ Spreadsheets
□ Schematic diagrams/charts
Other: ________________________
A.4. Risk Identification
This group of questions asks specifics about the Information Security Risk Management (ISRM) approach at your orga-
nization. In particular these questions target the the way how risks are identified at your organization as part of your ISMS
or ISRM initiative. According to ISO 27005 Risk Identification is "[...] the process to find, list and characterize elements of
risk".
RI000: Does your organization perform Information Security Risk Management (ISRM) or related activities?
(Yes/No)
◦ Yes ◦ No
Please choose Yes, if your organization has established ISRM processes or conducts any kinds of tasks in support of information security
risk management (identification, estimation or evaluation of information security risks, treatment of information security risks, assessment
of protection levels for assets, etc.).
Only choose No, if your organization does NOT perform any kind of Information Security Risk Management (ISRM).
RI001: Rate the following statements with regard to the information security
risk identification approach of your organization.
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Risk identification is performed automatically. ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Every relevant security risk is identified in a timely fashion. ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Sharing of relevant security information is conducted via a formal process. ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Relevant security information is automatically preprocessed and filtered for conducting risk
identification.
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Exchange of security information with other organizations and individuals has been bene-
ficial for risk identification.
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
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RI002: Which aspects are considered for information security risk identification in your organization?
(Multiple+)
□ Assets
□ Threats
□ Vulnerabilities
□ Existing or Planned Controls and Countermeasures
□ Security Incidents
□ Consequences
□ Security Goals
□ Required Protection Level of Assets
Other: ________________________
RI003: Which EXTERNAL information sources are used for information security risk identification in your
organization?
(Multiple+)
□ Newspapers
□Wikis
□ Blogs
□Mailinglists
□ Social Media
□ Exploit Database
□ Vulnerability Database
□ Vendor-specific Advisories
□ Threat Intelligence Sharing Platforms
□ Special Interest Groups
Other: ________________________
RI004: Which are the three most important EXTERNAL information sources for information security risk
identification in your organization?
(Ranking)
RI005: Which INTERNAL information sources are used for information security risk identification in your
organization?
(Multiple+)
□ Security Policy
□ Checklists
□ Best Practices
□ Issue Tracker
□ Incident Management
□ Internal (Security) Reviews
□ Audit Protocols
□ (Penetration) Test Reports
□ Security Monitoring Tools
Other: ________________________
RI006: Which are the three most important INTERNAL information sources for information security risk
identification in your organization?
(Ranking)
RI007: Which stakeholders are involved in information security risk identification in your organization?
(Multiple+)
□ Chief Information Officer
□ Chief Information Security Officer
□ Chief Technology Officer
□ Head of IT Department
□ Security Manager
□ Security Analyst
□ Security Engineer
□ Security Consultant
□ Risk Manager
□ Quality Manager
□ Compliance Manager
□ Software/Systems/Network Engineer
□ Software/Systems/Network Architect
□ Software Developer
Other: ________________________
RI008: How many stakeholders are involved in information security risk identification within your organization?
(Single+)
◦ < 5 Employees
◦ 5 - 10 employees
◦ 20 - 25 employees
◦ > 25 employees
◦ No answer
Comment: ________________________________________________
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RI009: How is the collaboration between stakeholders for information security risk identification designed and
which tools are used to document identified risks in your organization?
(Multiple+)
□ Email
□ Chat
□ Forum
□ Telephone□ Face-to-Face Meetings
□ Threat Intelligence Sharing Platform
□ Task Management System
□ Risk Management Tool
□ ISMS Tool
□ Governance, Risk Management and Compliance (GRC)
Tool
□ Document Management System
□Wiki
□ Reports
□ Spreadsheets
Other: ________________________
RI010: Which methods are used for identifying information security risks in your organization?
(Multiple+)
□ Brainstorming
□ Checklists
□ Structured What If Technique (SWIFT)
□ Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)
□ Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
□ Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP)
□ Cause and Consequence Analysis (CCA)
□ Reliability Availability, Maintainability Analysis (RAM)
□ CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Method
(CRAMM)
□ Information Security Risk Analysis Method (ISRAM)
□ CORAS Method
□ Consultative, Objective and Bi-functional Risk Analysis
(COBRA)
□ Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability
Evaluation (OCTAVE)
Other: ________________________
RI011: What are the most pressing challenges during information security risk identification for your
organization?
(Open)
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
RI003alt: Which EXTERNAL information sources supporting the identification of information security risks do
you know?
(Multiple+)
□ Newspapers
□Wikis
□ Blogs
□Mailinglists
□ Social Media
□ Exploit Database
□ Vulnerability Database
□ Vendor-specific Advisories
□ Threat Intelligence Sharing Platforms
□ Special Interest Groups
Other: ________________________
RI005alt: Which INTERNAL information sources supporting the identification of information security risks do
you know?
(Multiple+)
□ Security Policy
□ Checklists
□ Best Practices
□ Issue Tracker
□ Incident Management
□ Internal (Security) Reviews
□ Audit Protocols
□ (Penetration) Test Reports
□ Security Monitoring Tools
Other: ________________________
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RI009alt: How would you prefer to design the collaboration between stakeholders for information security risk
identification and which tools would you prefer to use to document identified risks?
(Multiple+)
□ Email
□ Chat
□ Forum
□ Telephone□ Face-to-Face Meetings
□ Threat Intelligence Sharing Platform
□ Task Management System
□ Risk Management Tool
□ ISMS Tool
□ Governance, Risk Management and Compliance (GRC)
Tool
□ Document Management System
□Wiki
□ Reports
□ Spreadsheets
Other: ________________________
RI010alt: Which methods for identifying information security risks do you know?(Multiple+)
□ Brainstorming
□ Checklists
□ Structured What If Technique (SWIFT)
□ Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)
□ Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
□ Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP)
□ Cause and Consequence Analysis (CCA)
□ Reliability Availability, Maintainability Analysis (RAM)
□ CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Method
(CRAMM)
□ Information Security Risk Analysis Method (ISRAM)
□ CORAS Method
□ Consultative, Objective and Bi-functional Risk Analysis
(COBRA)
□ Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability
Evaluation (OCTAVE)
Other: ________________________
A.5. Risk Estimation, Evaluation and Treatment
This group of questions asks specifics about the Information Security Risk Management (ISRM) approach at your orga-
nization. In particular these questions target the the way how risks are estimated/evaluated at your organization as part of
your ISMS or ISRM initiative and how your organization decides which treatment options of risks are pursued. According to
ISO 27005 Risk Estimation is "[...] the process to assign values to the probability and consequence of a risk" whereas Risk
Evaluation is defined as "[...] the process of comparing the results of risk analysis [...] to determine whether the risk and/or
its magnitude is acceptable or tolerable."
RE001: Which stakeholders are involved in information security risk estimation and evaluation in your
organization?
(Multiple+)
□ Chief Information Officer
□ Chief Information Security Officer
□ Chief Technology Officer
□ Head of IT Department
□ Security Manager
□ Security Analyst
□ Security Engineer
□ Security Consultant
□ Risk Manager
□ Quality Manager
□ Compliance Manager
□ Software/Systems/Network Engineer
□ Software/Systems/Network Architect
□ Software Developer
Other: ________________________
RE002: How many stakeholders are involved in the estimation of information security risks in your organization?
(Single+)
◦ < 5 Employees
◦ 5 - 10 employees
◦ 20 - 25 employees
◦ > 25 employees
◦ No answer
Comment: ________________________________________________
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RE003: How is the collaboration between stakeholders for information security risk estimation and evaluation
designed and which tools are used to document the risk estimation results in your organization?
(Multiple+)
□ Email
□ Chat
□ Forum
□ Telephone□ Face-to-Face Meetings
□ Threat Intelligence Sharing Platform
□ Task Management System
□ Risk Management Tool
□ ISMS Tool
□ Governance, Risk Management and Compliance (GRC)
Tool
□ Document Management System
□Wiki
□ Reports
□ Spreadsheets
Other: ________________________
RE004: Your organization’s risk estimation approach is ...
(Single+)
◦Qualitative (Subjective and scale-based, e.g., critical, high,
medium, low)
◦ Semi-Quantitative
◦ Quantitative (Calculated, e.g., expected annual financial
loss)
◦ Don’t know
◦ No answer
Comment: ________________________________________________
RE005: Which methods are used for estimating information security risks in your organization?
(Multiple+)
□ Brainstorming
□ Structured What If Technique (SWIFT)
□ Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)
□ Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
□ Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP)
□ Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
□ Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
□ Cause and Consequence Analysis (CCA)
□Monte-Carlo Simulation
□ Reliability Availability, Maintainability Analysis (RAM)
□ CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Method
(CRAMM)
□ Information Security Risk Analysis Method (ISRAM)
□ CORAS Method
□ Consultative, Objective and Bi-functional Risk Analysis
(COBRA)
□ Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability
Evaluation (OCTAVE)
Other: ________________________
RE006: Rate the following statements with regard to the information security
risk estimation approach in your organization.
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Dependencies between ASSETS (e.g., between business processes and the IT infrastructure
to deliver them) are considered when estimating security risks.
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Dependencies between RISKS (e.g., between risk of a reduced availability of a virtualized
server and the risk of reduced availability of the hardware node it is running on) are con-
sidered when estimating security risks.
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
The estimation of the PROBABILITY of a single risk to materialize takes related risks into
account.
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
The estimation of the LIKELIHOOD of a single risk to materialize takes related risks into
account.
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Risk estimation is performed automatically. ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Michael Brunner et al.: Preprint submitted to Elsevier Journal of Computers & Security Page 29 of 32
Risk Management Practices in Information Security: Exploring the Status Quo in the DACH Region
RE007: Which methods are used to prioritize estimated information security risks in your organization?
(Multiple+)
□ Risk Matrix
□ Risk Priority Number
□ Relative Risk Ranking
□ Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
Other: ________________________
RE008: What are the most pressing challenges during information security risk estimation and evaluation for
your organization?
(Open)
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
RE009: How do you decide whether information security risks are accepted or treated in your organization?
(Multiple+)
□ Defined risk acceptance criteria
□ Cost-benefit analysis of treatment options
□Management Decision
Other: ________________________
RE003alt: How would you prefer to design the collaboration between stakeholders for information security risk
estimation and evaluation and which tools would you prefer to use to document risk estimation results?
(Multiple+)
□ Email
□ Chat
□ Forum
□ Telephone□ Face-to-Face Meetings
□ Threat Intelligence Sharing Platform
□ Task Management System
□ Risk Management Tool
□ ISMS Tool
□ Governance, Risk Management and Compliance (GRC)
Tool
□ Document Management System
□Wiki
□ Reports
□ Spreadsheets
Other: ________________________
RE004alt: I would prefer to utilize a ... risk estimation approach.(Single+)
◦Qualitative (Subjective and scale-based, e.g., critical, high,
medium, low)
◦ Semi-Quantitative
◦ Quantitative (Calculated, e.g., expected annual financial
loss)
◦ Don’t know
◦ No answer
Comment: ________________________________________________
RE005alt: Which methods for estimating information security risks do you know?(Multiple+)
□ Brainstorming
□ Structured What If Technique (SWIFT)
□ Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)
□ Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
□ Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP)
□ Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
□ Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
□ Cause and Consequence Analysis (CCA)
□Monte-Carlo Simulation
□ Reliability Availability, Maintainability Analysis (RAM)
□ CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Method
(CRAMM)
□ Information Security Risk Analysis Method (ISRAM)
□ CORAS Method
□ Consultative, Objective and Bi-functional Risk Analysis
(COBRA)
□ Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability
Evaluation (OCTAVE)
Other: ________________________
A.6. Security Goals, Requirements and Controls
This additional group of questions asks specifics about the way that security goals, requirements and controls are defined
and documented at your organization. According to ISO 27000 a security control is defined as "[...] measure that is modifying
risk", a requirement is a "[...] need or expectation that is stated, generally implied or obligatory" and goals typically describe
"[...] results to be achieved".
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SE000: May we ask you additional questions regarding the definition and documentation of security goals,
requirements and controls.
(Yes/No)
◦ Yes ◦ No
Thank you for answering the previous questions. If you can spare another 5 minutes, we would like to ask you about the definition and
documentation of security goals, requirements and controls.
SE001: Rate the following statements with regard to the elicitation and
documentation of security goals, requirements and controls within your
organization.
(Rating)
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We do NOT define or document security goals, requirements or controls. ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
We distinguish between security goals, requirements and controls. ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Documentation of security goals, requirements and controls is orchestrated in a centralized
manner.
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Security goals, requirements and controls are evaluated with regard to their degree of ful-
fillment on a regular basis.
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
The elicitation of security controls is performed automatically. ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
The fulfillment of security controls is automatically evaluated. ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
SE002: Which stakeholders are involved in defining security requirements and controls to treat relevant security
risks in your organization?
(Multiple+)
□ Chief Information Officer
□ Chief Information Security Officer
□ Chief Technology Officer
□ Head of IT Department
□ Security Manager
□ Security Analyst
□ Security Engineer
□ Security Consultant
□ Risk Manager
□ Quality Manager
□ Compliance Manager
□ Software/Systems/Network Engineer
□ Software/Systems/Network Architect
□ Software Developer
Other: ________________________
SE003: How many stakeholders are involved in the definition of security requirements or controls in your
organization?
(Single+)
◦ < 5 Employees
◦ 5 - 10 employees
◦ 20 - 25 employees
◦ > 25 employees
◦ No answer
Comment: ________________________________________________
SE004: Which EXTERNAL information sources are used in finding appropriate security goals, requirements and
controls in your organization?
(Multiple+)
□ Standards
□ Industry Best Practices
□ Security Control Catalogues
□ Software Tools
□ Security Consultants
Other: ________________________
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SE005: Which tools are used to document security requirements and controls in your organization?
(Multiple+)
□ Reports
□ Spreadsheets
□Wiki
□ Document Management System
□ Risk Management Tool
□ ISMS Tool
□ Governance, Risk Management and Compliance (GRC)
Tool
Other: ________________________
SE006: Which attributes and aspects are documented for security goals, requirements and controls in your
organization?
(Multiple+)
□ Description
□ Rationale
□ Current Degree of Fulfillment
□ History of Changes of the Degree of Fulfillment
□ Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, Informed (RACI)
Stakeholders or Organizational Units
□ Audit Procedures
□ Adressed Risks
□ Associated Assets
□ History of Changes (excl. Degree of Fulfillment)
Other: ________________________
SE007: What are the most pressing challenges regarding the definition and documentation of security
requirements and controls for your organization?
(Open)
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
B. Invitation Mail
Dear <PARTICIPANT-NAME>,
We are writing to request your participation in our explorative risk management study of information security risk and com-
pliance experts in the D.A.CH. area. This study investigates the current practice and shortcomings in information security
risk management workflows. The study is conducted by the <AUTHOR-AFFILIATION> and the findings will provide am-
ple information on viable approaches for novel risk-driven information security management workflows that will additionally
address the areas of risk treatment and monitoring.
All responses are stored anonymously, none of the responses will be connected to identifying information, the results will be
used for statistical purposes and will be reported only in aggregated form. The survey will take approximately 20 minutes to
complete.
To participate, please click on the following link: <SURVEY-URL>
If you have any questions about this survey, or difficulty in accessing the site or completing the survey, please contact
<AUTHOR-URL>.
Thank you in advance for participating in this survey.
Sincerely, <AUTHOR>
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